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Abstract 
It is widely accepted that consciousness at the start of the 20th century was 
considered mainly in the context of neurology and the mind-body problem 
belonged to the domain of neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, later 
broadened by behavioural science and cognitive science. However, these 
disciplines cannot completely explain the correlation between mental activity and 
matter.  
Chapter one starts by defining the difficulty of determining consciousness. A 
discussion of how philosophers (such as Descartes, Locke, Dennett and Nagel) 
attempted to describe this phenomenon leads to the conclusion that firstly, 
consciousness is indefinable and secondly, it continues to be a challenge for both 
– philosophy and science – to explain how subjective consciousness fits into the 
objective world. The following two parts of the chapter focus on the major 
philosophical theories of the mind-body problem.  
In chapter two there is a focus on the mutual relation between philosophy and 
science, physics in particular. However, this project deals more with the 
implications of science for the philosophy of mind and mind-body problem than the 
science itself. The second enquiry of this chapter is to point out the difference in 
philosophical and scientific understanding of the word ‘substance’ (crucial to the 
mind-body problem).  
Chapter three considers quantum theory, since the relation between mind and 
body started to be tackled from the completely new point of view, after the 
philosophers began to assimilate the implications of quantum physics. Firstly, 
there is a short introduction to quantum theory and the most significant points for 
philosophy and quantum mechanics issues are provided (such as quantum 
superposition, the measurement problem or the backward causation). Analysis of 
three prevailing theories is provided.  
This project addresses the contribution of quantum mechanics to the studies of 
consciousness and matter and examines whether it helps in solving the mind-body 
problem. 
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Introduction 
 
It is widely accepted that consciousness at the start of the 20th century was considered 
mainly in the context of neurology and the mind-body problem belonged to the domain of 
neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, later broadened by behavioural science and 
cognitive science. Although, philosophers and scientists have been concerned with this 
concept for millennia, since it is  
 
both the most obvious and the most mysterious feature of our minds. On the one 
hand, what could be more certain or manifest to each of us that he or she is a 
subject of experience, an enjoyer of perceptions and sensations, a sufferer of pain, 
an entertainer of ideas, and a conscious deliberator? One the other hand, what in 
the world can consciousness be? How can physical bodies in the physical world 
contain such a phenomenon?1 
 
However, these disciplines cannot completely explain the correlation between mental 
activity and matter. It remains a big challenge to explain how subjective or phenomenal 
consciousness fits into the objective world. Dualists claim that the mind is separate and 
distinct from the body, but this gives rise to the problem of their mutual interaction. On the 
other hand, monists state that subjective mind and objective brain are united behind their 
appearances. The problem for materialism is to explain how something that appears so 
different, such as mind and matter, can be identical. A new branch of physics, quantum 
mechanics, brings fresh insight into the problem. This project’s objectives are to review 
and assess the major philosophical theories of the mind-body problem and to critically 
examine whether quantum mechanics helps to bring more understanding to the mind-
body interaction. 
 
Chapter one starts by defining the difficulty of determining consciousness. While no 
objective scientific definition seems to be able to capture the essence of this 
phenomenon, it is still possible to give examples for what tends intuitively to be called 
consciousness or being conscious. However, explaining the epistemological basis of 
consciousness highlights major doubts, since all experienced phenomena are private and 
subjective (and it is impossible to convey someone’s private experiences and their 
                                                          
1
 Gregory, R. L. (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 160. 
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qualities to anyone else). From the seventeenth century, philosophers have started to use 
the term consciousness in a more specific way, making it a central point when thinking 
about the mind. Firstly, Descartes defines ‘thought’ as a state of reflexive consciousness 
and self-awareness and ‘conscious experience’ as ‘everything that takes place within 
ourselves so that we are aware of it (nobis consciis), in so far as it is an object of our 
awareness (conscientia)’.2 Then John Locke states that consciousness is essential to 
thought to the same degree as to personal identity and claims that ‘we know certainly, by 
experience, that we sometimes think; and thence draw this infallible consequence, that 
there is something in us that has a power to think’.3 Perceptions, sensations, feelings and 
thoughts have thus become key words when describing mental states. In the twentieth 
century, theories have arisen in order to put a subjective consciousness into the objective 
world (meaning: world accessible by science, where two different people have to agree 
that 2+2 always equals 4), taking the role of the brain functions into account. David 
Chalmers has distinguished the problem of consciousness between the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ 
problem.4 The ‘easy’ one refers to the objective neurological study of the brain and can be 
solved by using straightforward scientific method. It explains the role of different kinds of 
psychological states and their implementation in the brains of different creatures (analysis 
of pain, vision, memory, and so on). However, it does not give any explanation of all the 
feelings involved. The ‘hard’ problem, also identified as 'the explanatory gap' by Joseph 
Levine, is when we are trying to find the answer to where the feelings are from, how 
phenomenal consciousness can be explained and why it is ‘like something’ to be us? 5 It is 
the gap between what science can tell us and what we most want to explain.  
 
Consciousness is the subject of this project. A discussion of how philosophers (such as 
Descartes, Locke, Dennett and Nagel) attempted to describe this phenomenon leads to 
the conclusion that firstly, consciousness is indefinable and secondly, it continues to be a 
challenge for both – philosophy and science – to explain how subjective consciousness 
fits into the objective world and how it relates to scientific goings-on in the brain. While the 
first part of chapter one concerns the indefinability of consciousness and its main features, 
the following two parts focus on the major philosophical theories of the mind-body 
problem. In general, theories fall into three main categories: dualist, monist and mysterian. 
Instead of focusing on the mysterian view that consciousness is a complete mystery and 
the understanding of this phenomenon is beyond human comprehension, this project 
                                                          
2
 Anscombe, E., Geach, P. T. (ed.), Descartes. Philosophical Writings (Norwich: Nelson’s University 
Paperbacks, 1970), p. 183.   
3
 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Dent, 1976), p. 37. 
4
 Chalmers, D., ‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3 (1995)  
< http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html>  [accessed 20 September 2012].   
5
 Levine, J., ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (1983)  
< http://www.umass.edu/philosophy/faculty/faculty-pages/levine.htm> [accessed 20 September 2012] (p. 357).  
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analyses and critically assesses the two prevailing theories of the mind-body problem in 
the philosophy of mind. These are Cartesian dualism and monism (two kinds of monistic 
approach are considered: materialism and idealism). Dualism naturally distinguishes 
subjective features of consciousness from brain activities. However, a problem occurs in 
how the interaction is possible between the subjective elements and the physical entities 
present in time and space, and how these subjective elements emerge. On the other 
hand, the monist theory does not make any distinction between the subjective mind and 
brain activity. The issue for monism is to explain how mind and brain can be one (or 
identical) when they appear to be so different. 
 
The evaluation of Descartes’ arguments for the existence of separate mind and body 
results in the conclusion that he rejects empirical knowledge and the majority of reasoning 
and its results in order to create the foundation of certain knowledge. However his 
argumentation is not convincing and is mistaken. The critical analysis of the monistic 
theories (behaviourism, functionalism, identity theory, idealism) produces a more 
adequate view of the relation between mind and body. The point to draw from in 
answering the first research question (what are the prevailing theories of the mind-body 
problem in the philosophy of mind) is underlining the tendency of moving towards a 
monistic option in the mind-body problem.  
 
Since the second research question critically examines whether quantum mechanics 
helps to solve the mind-body problem, in chapter two there is a focus on the mutual 
relation between philosophy and science, physics in particular, because all the largest 
systems in the history of philosophy (those that have given the beginning for other 
systems and which also continue to have permanent influence on human thoughts) have 
arisen from the reflections on scientific discoveries (such as mathematics that formed 
Plato’s system or logic and biology that influenced Aristotle). It does not matter if those 
reflections are made by people personally involved in scientific discoveries or rather 
applied to scientific revolution, which took place in their days or epoch directly preceding. 
In the whole history of philosophy two major tendencies are noticeable. The first is made 
up of problems concerning life and its sense with reference to the whole of reality. Our 
resources of knowledge of the world make up the second tendency. Our knowledge is 
changing constantly, which simply means that philosophy also has to change. Since the 
recent development of quantum theory has brought a fresh insight into the science, some 
of the theories of the mind and the body correlation should be reconsidered. However, this 
project deals more with the implications of science for the philosophy of mind and mind-
body problem than the science itself.  
11 
 
 
Jean Piaget’s concept of ‘the whole of reality’ that illustrates the strict connection of 
philosophy and science is presented.6 According to this, philosophy needs some kind of 
stimulus from outside for its development and verification. What is more, the development 
of the new science makes it similar to philosophy to a large extent. The new physics deals 
with the fundamental, deep and the most general aspects and features of reality. On the 
other hand, Wittgenstein underlines that philosophy can never be a science. He claims 
that while philosophy ‘clarifies the limits of meaningful language’, science ‘studies the 
existence or nonexistence of states of affairs’. 7 It looks at not only things that are not 
scientific facts, but things that cannot even be verified. The ethical propositions show but 
cannot say; they represent attitude towards the world. In this case, they cannot be 
explained by the use of scientific method. Nevertheless, philosophy is often inspired by 
science, such as Wittgenstein’s views, which were inspired by mathematical logic.  
 
The second enquiry of this chapter is to point out the difference in philosophical and 
scientific understanding of the word ‘substance’ (crucial to the mind-body problem). The 
meaning of ‘substance’ for some philosophers (for example: Aristotle, Descartes and 
Spinoza) is contrasted with the scientific and physical equivalent. An enquiry into what the 
difference between those meanings is leads to a discussion  of possible inadequacies and 
inaccuracies in interpreting physical events by philosophers and philosophical issues by 
physicists. However, when methods in the new physics are changing, and as at the 
advanced level it is becoming more and more speculative, it seems to be becoming even 
more closely connected with philosophy. It can be a forerunner of a return to the pre-
Aristotelian distinction between  philosophy as a study of being and physics as an 
empirical reflection of nature, when the subject of philosophy and physics was identical. 
 
Chapter three considers quantum theory, since the relation between mind and body 
started to be tackled from the completely new point of view, after the philosophers began 
to assimilate the implications of quantum physics (for example: quantum superposition or 
non-locality). Firstly, there is a short introduction to quantum theory and the most 
significant points for philosophy and quantum mechanics issues are provided (such as 
quantum superposition, the measurement problem or the backward causation). However, 
‘it may sound preposterous to imagine that the mathematics of quantum theory has 
something to say about the nature of human thinking’, the project investigates in a further 
                                                          
6
 Piaget, J., Insights and Illusions of Philosophy (Oxon: Routledge, 1997), p. 39-47. 
7
 Heaton, J., Groves, J., Wittgenstein For Beginners (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1994), p. 41. 
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three sections of chapter three, whether there is any merit in adopting quantum 
mechanics for the studies of consciousness and matter.8 Analysis of three prevailing 
theories is provided. Firstly, Roger Penrose argues that quantum theory can be effectively 
applied for explaining consciousness.9 His views are under the strong influence of the 
nature of creativity, mathematical insight and the idea of a Platonic reality beyond mind 
and matter. Penrose, as a supporter of physicalism, assumes that all mental processes 
can be reduced to physical events. This assumption makes up the basis of the 
relationships between the physical word and the world of consciousness in the ontology 
he worked out. However, his non-algorithmic mathematical materialism is often criticized 
to be obscure and lacking in evidence. Similarly, David Hodgson draws on quantum 
indeterminacy and non-locality to outline a theory of the relationship between mind and 
brain. He states that mental and physical events are aspects of manifestations of the 
same events of the brain-mind and there are some discoverable correlations between 
them. He claims that macro-physical events of neural firings are aspects of micro events 
in the quantum world, which means that mental events are closer related to quantum 
events than to the neural firings themselves. Hodgson’s idea of co-operating conscious 
subsystems is based on the view that ‘mind and brain are both manifestations of the same 
underlying reality’.10 On the other hand, Amit Goswami applies quantum theory of 
consciousness to the mind-body problem in monistic idealism. Goswami’s  views on 
quantum theory and monistic idealism are the combination of the aspects of quantum 
physics with the mental monist view that there is a living consciousness being which we 
understand to be physical reality, but in reality it is really an emergent epiphenomenon.11 
Considering Goswami’s monistic idealism, the risks of applying the theories chaining 
together mysticism and New Age with quantum theory and philosophy of mind are 
underlined. The whole project applies the analytical approach that provides a 
philosophical methodology. It is used as a structure for testing the coherency of 
arguments and the validity of quantum mechanics for the philosophy of mind, as well as 
for collecting and analysing data. The diverse textual sources are empirically verified and 
theses are tested for their trueness or falsity. The project is interdisciplinary and 
encompasses the philosophy of mind with the mathematical thesis and theories from the 
new physics. Thus it combines the examination of empirical and logical knowledge 
together with more subjective philosophical statements. Systematic analytic thought 
through textual analysis produces a comprehensive summary of used theories and 
numerous counter-arguments for the given thesis. 
                                                          
8
 Buchanan, M., ‘Quantum Minds’, New Scientist, 2828 (2011) 34-37 (p. 37). 
9
 Penrose, R., Makroświat, Mikroświat i Ludzki Umysł (Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka, 1997), p. 103. 
10
 Hodgson, D., The Mind Matters (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 381. 
11
 Hamilton, C., ‘Scientific Proof of the Existence of God. An interview with Amit Goswami’, What is 
Enlightment?, 11 (1997) <http://www.enlightennext.org/magazine/j11/goswami.asp> [accessed 15 December 
2012].  
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The quantum world defies the rules of ordinary logic. Particles routinely occupy two 
or more places at the same time and do not even have well-defined properties until 
they are measured. It is all strange, yet true – quantum theory is the most accurate 
scientific theory ever tested and its mathematics is perfectly suited to the 
weirdness of the atomic world.12  
 
However, a problem occurs in that quantum mechanics is only a theory and it is not clear 
what influence and consequences it can have for the understanding of minds. Although 
theoretical, quantum mechanics has initiated a reexamination of the views of brains and 
bodies so far. It may explain consciousness and give the answers to the age-old 
metaphysical questions about the relationship and parallelisms of body and mind. On the 
other hand, it may not. This project addresses the contribution of quantum mechanics to 
the studies of consciousness and matter and examines whether it helps in solving the 
mind-body problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Buchanan, M., ‘Quantum Minds’, New Scientist, 2828 (2011) 34-37 (p. 37). 
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Chapter 1 
 
1.1.  Consciousness.  
 
Explaining the nature of consciousness and providing its complete definition is one of the 
most important and perplexing areas of philosophy and science. According to Daniel 
Dennet, 
 
Science does not answer all good questions. Neither does philosophy. But for that 
very reason the phenomena of consciousness […] do not need to be protected 
from science – or from the sort of demystifying philosophical investigation.13  
  
Formulating the epistemological basis of consciousness causes major doubts. Since, 
defined narrowly, epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and 
limitations of knowledge and justified beliefs, it is difficult to deal with problems such as 
defining the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge considering a personal 
inner privacy or absolute and inviolate individuality. The contemporary objective 
psychology, hard sciences (for example, neurophysiology or physics) and evidence-based 
medicine contend with epistemological difficulties of explaining consciousness. There is 
an inner world of a particular consciousness and, 
 
as long as you can avoid any severe cranial trauma or anesthetist’s ministrations, 
and as long as you can evade sleep, you can peer from this inner world, perhaps 
reacting to and interacting with the outside world of objective time and space, but 
all the time remaining distinct from it.14  
 
In twenty-first century, consciousness is considered mainly in the context of neurology and 
the mind-body problem belongs to the domain of neuroscience, psychology and 
philosophy, broadened by behavioural science and cognitive science. Nevertheless, these 
disciplines cannot completely explain the correlation between mental activity and matter. 
 
Among the great number of mysteries that mankind has been dealing with from the dawn 
of time, human consciousness is, as Daniel Dennett states, ‘just about the last surviving 
                                                          
13
 Dennett, D. C., Consciousness Explained (London: The Penguin Press, 1991), p. 22. 
14
 Greenfield, S. A., Journey to the Centers of the Mind (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1995), p. 1. 
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mystery. A mystery is a phenomenon that people do not know how to think about – yet’.15  
Whilst most of the enigmas such as the origin of the universe, phenomenon of time, space 
and gravity still remain unsolved and the final answer is yet to be found, people have at 
least learnt the way to think about them, and have developed some definitions and set the 
ground for discussion about them. Meanwhile, ‘regarded from the standpoint of physical 
science, the most puzzling thing about consciousness (…) is the fact that it exists at all’ 
and attempts to explain the phenomenon of consciousness still encounter a fundamental 
obstacle, which is a definition of what consciousness actually is.16 
 
The indefinability of consciousness causes the major problems in explanation what this 
phenomenon really is. However, it is still possible to give examples for what tends 
intuitively to be called consciousness or being conscious. There is a big difference 
between having a tooth drilled without local anaesthetic and having it drilled with one. The 
purpose of the anaesthetic is to remove the consciousness of pain.  Similarly, there is a 
difference between having eyes open and closed. When eyes are shut, what disappears 
is the conscious visual experience. Consciousness can be explained as the difference 
between being awake and being asleep. However, this is not quite right, because dream 
experiences (especially in nightmares or fantasies) are conscious too. Consciousness is 
lost in a dreamless sleep or during a total anaesthetic. The reason for explaining 
consciousness with examples rather than definitions is that ‘no objective, scientific 
definition seems able to capture the essence of consciousness’.17 
 
Originally, the term ‘consciousness’ refers to awareness and knowledge, and represents 
the sense of experiencing something: the sense of the presence or the occurring of 
something in the field of its inner perception.18 However, in common use the word 
‘consciousness’ bears a lot of meanings: we can lose and regain consciousness; be 
conscious of one’s appearance; or take conscious decisions. It can be equated to the light 
– it exposes something, brings it out the darkness of unconsciousness and has different 
levels of intensity or range. There is also ‘stream of consciousness’ – the sequence of the 
states that the self realises and the acts belonging to a particular self. There is also self-
consciousness (the awareness of oneself as an individual), or being a part of a certain 
socio-economic class builds a particular class-consciousness. In the realm of spiritual 
                                                          
15
 Dennett, D. C., Consciousness Explained (London: The Penguin Press, 1991), p. 21. 
16
 Lockwood, M., Mind, Brain and the Quantum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 1. 
17
 Papineau, D., Selina, H., Introducing Consciousness (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2000), p. 6. 
18
 Frankish, K., Consciousness (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2005), p. 1-2. 
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development, a number consciousness rising activities are known, leading to ‘pure 
consciousness’ as a state of  mental awareness devoid of all particular content. Some 
drugs alter our perception in the way we have a subjective sensation of our  
consciousness being enhanced or broadened.19 Consciousness can have an active 
character (for example: the act of cognition, the act of decision or the act of imagining 
something) or a non-active character (such as moods or passive sensations).      
 
It was back in the seventeenth century that philosophers started to use the term in a more 
specific way, making consciousness a central point when thinking about the mind. 
Perceptions, sensations, feelings and thoughts have now become key words when 
describing mental states. In his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes wrote: ‘By the term 
'thought' (cogitato, pensée) I comprehend all that in us, so that we are immediately 
conscious of it. Thus, all the operations of the will, intellect, imagination, and senses, are 
thoughts’.20 Thus he defined ‘thought’ as a state of reflexive consciousness and self-
awareness. The notion of that phenomenon was later expanded by John Locke, who 
stated that consciousness is essential to thought to the same degree as to personal 
identity. In  An Essay on Human Understanding he goes onto say 
 
I do not say, there is no soul in man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; 
but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking, or sleeping, without being 
sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing but our 
thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it always will be, necessary, till we can 
think without being conscious of it. […] I grant that the soul in a waking man is 
never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake; but whether 
sleeping without dreaming be not as affection of the whole man, mind as well as 
body, may be worth a waking man’s consideration; it being hard to conceive that 
any thing should think and not be conscious of it.21  
 
The focus of interest for the philosophers at that time was not  the nature of  those mental 
states per se, but rather on ‘what is special about those perceptions, sensations, feelings 
and thoughts that have a feel to them. What exactly is this feeling that conscious 
experience have’.22 And, why it seems that there is something determining ‘what it is like 
to be’ conscious of somebody. ‘What-is-it-likeness’ is one of the features characterising 
consciousness. This feature was developed mainly by the American philosopher, Thomas 
                                                          
19
 ibid. 
20
 Descartes, R., The Principles of Philosophy (The Online Library of Liberty)  
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1698&chapter=142027&layout=ht
ml&Itemid=27> [accessed 02 January 2012]. 
21
 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Ward Lock and Co. Ltd, 1910), p. 63. 
22
 Frankish, K., Consciousness (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2005), p. 5. 
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Nagel, who asked the famous question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ bringing this very 
important notion of 'what-is-it-likeness' to discussion about consciousness. Being a bat is 
a totally different experience to being a human; man cannot know what a bat thinks, what 
its feelings and sensations are. Man does not know how a bat perceives the world and – 
what is the most important thing – man cannot have any of the bat’s experiences. Flying, 
eating insects and echolocatory are totally strange to people. All people can do is to try to 
imagine what it is like to experience these things. However, there is still a problem: the 
imagination is limited and based on prior experiences. In consequence, everything that 
people can imagine, is what it would be like for them to behave as a bat behaves, which 
still is not the answer for ‘what is it like for a bat to be a bat?’. It is just imagining the bat’s 
sensations, not experiencing them as such, as bat does. What-it-is-likeness determines if 
a thing is conscious.23 
 
Another essential meaning of the term is phenomenality or phenomenal consciousness, 
which describes consciousness as a subjective experience or phenomenal experience. 
This is the way things appear to me, as opposed to how they are objectively. Distinction 
between kinds of state consciousness (‘your experiences being consciousness’ in contrast 
to creature consciousness – ‘you being consciousness’) has been made by the American 
philosopher Ned Block.24 He made a comparison between phenomenal consciousness (p-
consciousness),  which focuses on what it is like to be in a certain state, with access 
consciousness (a-consciousness), which refers to availability in the process of thinking or 
guiding actions and speech. P-consciousness is the main subject Nagel explores and is 
the core of the problem of consciousness.25 
 
When discussing consciousness, qualia have to be mentioned, since they are not only a 
very important feature of consciousness, but also they cause a fundamental problem for 
materialists in explaining mind-body dichotomy.  Qualia are the ineffable subjective 
qualities of experience, such as the redness of red or the indescribable smell of 
turpentine. These subjective feelings are properties that physical objects do not 
possess.26 However, many philosophers such as Paul Churchland and Daniel Dennett  
refuse to accept qualia as truly existing. Dennett in particular criticises it as a fallacy 
                                                          
23
 Nagel, T., ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, The Philosophical Review,  4 (1974),  
<http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf> [accessed 25 April 2011]. 
24
 Block, N., Consciousness, Function, and Representation (Massachusetts: MIT, 2007), p. 276-291. 
25
 ibid. 
26
 Blackmore, S., Consciousness. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 6-9. 
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inherited from the previous philosophical traditions. He claims that qualia come from the 
clearest intuitions about mind that philosophers used to have and  
 
form a mutually self-supporting closed circles of doctrines, imprisoning their 
imaginations in the Cartesian Theater. Even though philosophers have discovered 
the paradoxes inherent in this closed circle of ideas – that is why the literature on 
qualia exists – they have not had a whole alternative vision to leap to, and so, 
trusting their still-strong intuitions, they get dragged  back into the paradoxical 
prison.27  
 
He tries to disqualify qualia with the use of science. For instance, the example with the 
redness of red in the scientific enquiry will be just a colourless electromagnetic radiation 
with the different lengths of waves that come across surfaces and can reflect or absorb 
that radiation. Dennett says that modern science has removed the notion of colour from 
the physical world and shows ‘that the light-reflecting properties of objects causes 
creatures to go into various discriminative states, scattered about in their brains, and 
underlying a host of innate dispositions and learned habits of varying complexity’.28  
 
Although, it is possible to specify and describe particular features of consciousness, it is 
still not possible to give an exact definition of that term. As Keith Frankish wrote in his 
book Consciousness: 'Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is 
impossible to specify what it is, what it does or why it evolved'.29 From a neurological point 
of view, it is certain that consciousness is closely dependant on the brain. For example: 
any mechanical damage or drugs that affect the brain as well as the stimulation of 
different parts of a brain can alter mental states. It is still a mystery though, how 
consciousness is generated by the brain. Michael Lockwood points out the necessity of 
avoiding the mistaken manner of thinking that scientists or neurologists do not have 
sufficient knowledge of how ‘the brain functions, in physic-chemical terms. For it seems 
clear that more knowledge of the same general kind that neuroscience currently offers 
could not – in principle could not – shed any further light on the fundamental problem that 
consciousness raises’.30 The Australian philosopher, David Chalmers, has distinguished 
the problem of consciousness between the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problem. The ‘easy’ one 
refers to the objective neurological study of the brain and can be solved using 
                                                          
27
 Dennett, D. C., Consciousness Explained (London: The Penguin Press, 1991), p. 370. 
28
 ibid., p. 372. 
29
 Frankish, K., Consciousness (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 2005), p. 1. 
30
 Lockwood, M., Mind, Brain and the Quantum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 1. 
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straightforward scientific method. It explains the role of different kinds of psychological 
states and their implementation in the brains of different creatures (analysis of pain, 
vision, memory, and so on). However, it does not give any explanation about all feelings 
involved. The ‘hard’ problem  (also identified as 'the explanatory gap' by the American 
philosopher, Joseph Levine) is  when we are trying to find the answer where the feelings 
are from, how phenomenal consciousness can be explained and why it is ‘like something’ 
to be us? It is the gap between that which science can tell us and that which we most 
want to explain.31  
 
The understanding of consciousness can be simplified to the three questions: ‘What’, 
‘How’, and ‘Why’ to describe the features of consciousness, explaining its underlying basis 
or cause, and explicating its role or value: 
 
- The Descriptive Question: What is consciousness? What are its principal features? 
And by what means can they best be discovered, described and modeled?  
- The Explanatory Question: How does consciousness of the relevant sort come to 
exist? Is it a primitive aspect of reality, and if not how does (or could) 
consciousness in the relevant respect arise from or be caused by non-conscious 
entities or processes?  
- The Functional Question: Why does consciousness of the relevant sort exist? 
Does it have a function, and if so what is it? Does it act causally and if so with what 
sorts of effects? Does it make a difference to the operation of systems in which it is 
present, and if so why and how?32  
 
Many theories have arisen in response to these questions which try to put a subjective 
consciousness into the objective world, taking the role of the brain functions into account. 
In general, theories fall into three main categories: dualist, monist and mysterian. The first 
naturally distinguishes subjective features of consciousness  from  brain activities. The 
dualist theories of mind ‘claim that mental states and processes are not merely states and 
processes of a purely physical system, but constitute a distinct kind of phenomenon that is 
essentially nonphysical in nature’.33 But, questions such as how interaction is possible 
between subjective elements and the physical entities present in time and space, and, 
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how these subjective elements emerge. Conversely, the monist theory does not make any 
distinction between the subjective mind and brain activity. All three theories claim that, 
‘what we call mental states and processes are merely sophisticated states and processes 
of a complex physical system: the brain’.34 The issue for monism is to explain how mind 
and brain can be one (or identical) if they appear to be so different. The mysterian theory 
deals with consciousness as a complete mystery which meanders cannot be solved by 
human beings at present, and possibly ever.35 Thus, this discussion will not include the 
evaluation of this option.  
 
1.2. Dualism. 
 
According to Paul Churchland the discussion about the epistemological basis of 
consciousness leads to  
the most obvious of the questions in this areas. What is the real nature of the 
mental states and processes? In what medium do they take place, and how are 
they related to the physical world? With regard to the mind, these questions 
address what philosophers call the ontological problem.36  
 
As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is, what sorts of things exist. 
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies the structure of reality and problems of 
the being and its features.  
 
Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology, like the question 
whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of universals. These 
are all problems in ontology in the sense that they deal with whether or not a 
certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists. But ontology is usually also taken to 
encompass problems about the most general features and relations of the entities 
which do exist. There are also a number of classic philosophical problems that are 
problems in ontology understood this way.37  
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The ontological problem in the philosophy of mind is more widely known as the mind-body 
problem. 
 
From ancient times people have been trying to discover and understand the true nature of 
the mind. The concept of a non-physical soul and physical body was initiated by Aristotle 
and Plato as a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter. 'After Plato, 
the most famous exponent of dualism was Rene Descartes (1596-1650). The fresh 
impetus Descartes gave to dualism was so strikingly original and compelling that the 
version he formulated is named after him and called Cartesian dualism'.38 Soul in religion 
and philosophy is the immaterial aspect or  essence of a human being. It is often 
considered synonymous with the mind or the self. A further definition of soul can be found 
in theology. According to theological belief, the soul is the part of an individual which 
partakes of divinity and survives the death of the body. However, the notion of ‘this 
everlasting life’ is incompatible with the view that if mental life of an individual ‘is identical 
with the functioning of that individual’s brain, it is clear that when at death the brain ceases 
to function the mental life must thereby come to an end’.39 Descartes describes soul as an 
incorporeal, immaterial logical substance, with no features of material body and, what is 
more, indivisible. He believes in the union of the body and the soul, each being a distinct 
substance acting on the other. The soul is also equivalent to the mind.40 Conceived of as 
res cogitans (a thinking thing), a person is totally different from his or her extended body 
(res extensa - a thing whose essence is extension in space). Descartes states the 
divisibility of body is a non-conscious machine incapable of thought and awareness. To 
sum up, the soul is conscious, but incapable of extension, while the body is extended, but 
incapable of consciousness and mentality.41 Descartes supposed the pineal gland (a 
small structure in a brain situated beneath the corpus callosum, near the centre of brain) 
to be a centre of the interaction between soul and body. John Heil supposed that if 
Descartes were right 'minute alternations in the motions of particles in the pineal gland 
radiated throughout the body via nervous system, producing muscular contractions and, 
ultimately, overt bodily motions'.42 However, this would violate the physical laws governing 
the micro-particles that make up the pineal gland and that is ‘an impossibility if we take the 
material world to be causally self-contained and laws of nature to be inviolable’.43    
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In Meditation I, Descartes presented the so called ‘Argument from doubt’ – probably his 
most famous argument in favour of dualism and the existence of soul. Descartes did not 
want to assess knowledge according to this – what is its subject – but according to the 
method by means of which we obtain that knowledge. Descartes did not make any 
distinction between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. He focused on 'how and by 
means of what' we gain knowledge rather than 'about what'. His fundamental question 
was: is anything from this, that we know, absolutely certain? Descartes started by 
questioning all beliefs that come from our senses. He claims that senses can delude us, 
therefore empirical methods do not have any learning value.  
 
Descartes' argument against the empirical knowledge was The Dream Argument. 
According to this, most of the time when we are dreaming, we are not aware  that we are 
dreaming but we can still dream so vividly, we can experience our dream reality with the 
same intensity as we experience reality when we are awake. 'For whether I am awake or 
sleeping, two and three added together always make five, and a square never has more 
than four sides; and it does not seem possible that truths so apparent can be suspected of 
any falsity or uncertainty'.44 
 
Up to this point, Descartes did not bring into doubt anything new; he had many 
predecessors who had done that before him (such as Plotinus and his distinctions 
between the nature of the soul and knowledge of its own nature that the soul 
possesses).45 But then, Descartes went even further: he stopped finding the rules of logic 
and mathematics certain. For this rule, no empirical sensation has any influence and even 
in a dream two plus two equals four. This is, no doubt, the breakthrough in Descartes' 
theory. Then, he presented two more arguments - The Deceiving God Argument and The 
Evil Demon Argument. According to these - no empirical, no mathematical certainty can 
be certain. Descartes believes that the powerful deceiver (that is God or, if we suppose 
God is supremely good, or some evil genius), who can give us any illusion He wants and 
He can delude us  whenever He wants. God in Descartes' eyes is above logic, and can 
make two plus two equal five and the Deceiver can delude us all the time. Descartes 
wrote ‘of all the opinions that I once accepted as true, there is not one which is not now 
legitimately open to doubt, not through any lack of reflection or lightness of judgement, but 
for very strong and deeply considered reasons’.46 
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Having rejected all empirical methods and knowledge, Descartes was now looking for 
certain knowledge that will be without any doubt. This is how he made the foundation for 
certain knowledge. As he wrote in Meditation II, ‘so that, after having thought carefully 
about it, and having scrupulously examined everything, one must then, in conclusion, take 
as assured that the proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every time I express it or 
conceive of it in my mind’.47 That is his famous cogito ergo sum. According to Descartes, it 
is impossible in systematic doubting to doubt whether oneself is doubting. What is more, 
doubting means that oneself  is thinking. And thus is the proof of existence: one who is 
thinking, has to exist. As a consequence of such argumentation, it is not possible to prove 
existence as a physical body but it is a solid proof that the thinking mind exists. The 
argument can be simplified as follows: 
 
1. I can doubt that I have body. 
2. I cannot doubt that I exist. 
3.  Therefore, I am not my body. 
4. Therefore, my mind is not my body. 
 
In a shorter version, this argument can be presented as: 
 
1. I can doubt that my body exists. 
2. I cannot doubt that I exist. 
3. Therefore, I must be different and distinct from my body. 
 
This argument relies on the principle called Leibniz's Law.48 According to this law, if A is 
identical to B, then any property of A is a property of B, or whatever is true of A is true of 
B. However, this argument proves unconvincing if we use the parallel argument to 
Descartes': 
 
1.Oedipus is going to marry the Queen of Thebes. 
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2. Oedipus does not know that the Queen of Thebes is his mother. 
3. Therefore, the Queen of Thebes cannot be his mother. 
 
Using this pattern, we come to the conclusion, that this way of reasoning has to be 
fallacious. We can consider that premises are true. However, the conclusion does not 
follow them. We can doubt  that a certain geometrical figure has some very particular 
property A and the same time, we cannot doubt that this figure has property B. However, it 
does not mean that from these two premises we can establish that B does not entail A.49 
 
There are also other problems for dualism, such as the contradiction of a basic scientific 
principle or the interaction problem. According to a basic scientific principle, every action 
or change in an object has some prior physical event. Thus, if an A-fibre or C-fibre 
transmission occurs, the neurologist can search for the physical cause of it. However, if 
we assume that pure mental activity (like a thought) can lead to action, it means that other 
mental events can lead to physical reactions. This issue is closely connected with the 
problem of interaction – if mind and body are two such different substances, how they can 
possibly interact? What is more, if physical activity in a brain is linked with  mental events 
(for example: severe damage to brain leads to mental deficiency) – are these two 
substances really so distinct? Moreover, dualism cannot be scientifically investigated, 
since science deals only with the physical world. Thus, the only aspect that could be 
scientifically investigated are the effects obtained in the world.         
 
1.3. Monism. 
 
Whilst dualist theory explains the separation between physical and mental events, ‘there 
are wholly monistic theories which assert that there only appear to be two types of events, 
and that there really is only one type of event’.50 Monism is a viewpoint in philosophy 
which claims that all things are homogenous in nature. Monism is divided into three 
groups: neutral monism (there is one type of event and it is neither exactly physical nor 
mental), materialistic monism (materialism) and idealistic monism (idealism). 
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The beginning of materialism dates back to ancient times, when Democritus described the 
world as a fleeting arrangement of atoms swirling in the void. Mental phenomena are 
described by Hobbes and La Mettrie as nothing more than the mechanical interaction of 
material components.51 Nowadays, materialism of one stripe or another is often not taken 
for granted; as David Levis said, ‘materialism is non negotiable’.52 Materialism discusses 
mental events as not self contained and always in relation to material beings. However, 
there are many different forms of materialism as well as definitions of ‘matter’ and 
‘material’. Preceded by the success of the Newtonian mechanics, it became common to 
use the term ‘material’ for everything that ‘has mass’. The concept of ‘matter’ is purely 
philosophical and it does not belong to any particular science, which means that it has to 
be defined in the manner that includes all objects examined by natural science. It cannot 
be done by defining material as being subject to changeability, duration in time and 
extension in space and law. Matter can also be described as a totality of existing 
objectively material beings, which can be examined by the senses (directly or indirectly). 
According to this definition, the concept of matter refers to macro subjects (including 
organisms), elementary particles, fields (gravitational, electromagnetic as well as nuclear 
forces), antimatter and other objects, including those not yet known.53  
 
Materialism or physicalism states that all mental phenomena can be explained by brain 
activity and are identical with it. As a result of such thinking, statements about mental 
events and states of brain activity are two different ways of considering the same subject. 
This concept denies the existence of non-material souls, beings of the nature of platonic 
ideas and a non-material god. However,  physicalism does not provide the answer to the 
relationship between mental and physical, biological and chemical activities in a body. 
This is a so-called mind-body problem, which can also be observed in the dualistic 
viewpoint in ontology. 
 
There are different faces of materialism, specifically, behaviourism, functionalism and 
identity theory. According to behaviourists such as Gilbert Ryle, talking about mental 
states is nothing more than describing in a shortened way people behaviours and 
predispositions to behaving in a particular manner. All problems discussed in mental 
terms can be described and then explained in terms of patterns of behaviour. 
Behaviourism depreciates scientific psychology based on introspection of subjective 
states as well as the concept of the mind as a sphere of mental events. For that reason, 
                                                          
51
 Heil, J., Philosophy of Mind. A Contemporary Introduction (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), p. 51. 
52
 ibid. 
53
 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Isaac Newton (Stanford: Stanford University, 2007)  
< http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton/#NewWorInf> [accessed 25 April 2011]. 
26 
 
the mind-body problem is basically non-existent in behaviourism.54 ‘Thinking, feeling and 
scheming are nothing more than ways of behaving’.55 The main problem with 
behaviourism is the failure of being able to make the distinction between somebody being 
in pain and just pretending to be in pain. Moreover, behaviourists reject qualia and leave 
the question of what it actually feels like to be in a very particular mental state without the 
answer.  
 
In functionalism, supported by David Levis, Hilary Putnam, mental states are in fact 
functional states which interact, playing a functional role in cognition. A ‘computer 
metaphor’ was introduced by functionalists to portray the mind as software and the brain 
as  hardware.56 Moreover 
 
functionalism allows for the possibility of non physical conscious beings. If states of 
mind are functional states, and if functional states are ‘realized’ in conscious 
creatures by states with an appropriate causal profile, this leaves open the 
possibility that immaterial beings could be conscious, think, feel pain.57  
 
As well as for behaviourism, qualia create a problem for functionalism. First of all, a 
computer analogy cannot give a complete explanation of the mind and secondly, 
functionalism does not explain the ‘what-is-it-likeness’ and does not give an adequate 
account of conscious experiences (being in pain, being happy, thinking about abstract 
ideas).    
 
Finally, identity theory claims that ‘mental events and their associated physical events are 
two different aspects or manifestations of the same events, two side as it were of the 
same coin’.58 Unlike functionalism, which  links every kind of conscious experience with 
interactions arising in complex physical states, identity theory identifies that experience 
with a particular physical state or its property. Thus, the concept of consciousness in 
identity theory is based on  neurophysiology and neurophysiological activity of the brain, 
while in functionalism, functional states arise between entries and exits of the system and 
different states of mind. The problem for identity theory occurs, when we assume that in 
the same brain states could be different thoughts. Two brains could be physically identical 
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(the same brain cells, fibres and molecules) and still mentally completely distinct. What is 
more, if mental events are identical with certain brain states, it should be possible to find 
the exact place where they are located. However, it is not conceivable to find in a brain 
the precise locations of the thoughts about family or weather.   
 
Similarly to materialism, idealistic monism is expressed in different forms. What these 
forms have in common is the acceptance of the thesis that the only self-contained beings 
are in fact nonmaterial substances. Both materialism and idealism have a common 
reductionist element – whilst minds and the content of the mind is reduced to material 
objects in materialism, in idealism material objects and their properties are reduced to 
minds and states of mind.59 Therefore, only mental states exist for the idealist, and all 
physical events and states are constructed from those states of mind. This view leaves 
the same problem as in case of materialism – how to describe the relationship between 
events that construct and events constructed. ‘Even regarding physical events and states 
as constructs from mental events and states, it is clear that mental events and states are 
closely associated with particular classes of such constructs, namely neutral activity in 
brains’.60 There is no argument in idealism that material objects are only states of mind. 
An even stronger claim is made: ‘talk of material objects is not merely false but positively 
meaningless’.61  
 
George Berkeley, the great philosopher of the early modern period, supported theory 
denying the existence of material substance and in his A  Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge wrote:  
 
it is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that 
they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are 
perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly 
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.62  
 
Berkeley’s claim is that nonmaterial human souls and God are self-contained. All material 
objects exist because they are perceived by God, and all ideas are the immediate objects 
of knowledge in a fundamental sense. Furthermore, because they are objects of 
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knowledge, there is a need for the existence of ‘something which knows or perceives 
them and exercise diverse operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them’.63 
Berkeley used different names for that ‘something’ – mind, spirit, soul or just myself – and 
underlines the distinction between ‘that something’  and ideas. Esse est percipi – to be is 
to be perceived, as Berkeley stated. As a consequence, the existence of unthinking (so 
unperceiving) things out of the mind is impossible as he states, ‘for as to what is said of 
the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, 
that seems perfectly unintelligible’.64  
 
What is worth underlining, in Berkeley’s subjective idealism is that physical objects do not 
exist objectively, i.e. independently from the perceiving subject. However, it does not 
automatically mean that the act of perceiving causes the objective existence of the 
physical object and the end of the act makes the object disappear. There is no objective 
existence of objects in subjective idealism. What their existence depends on is perception. 
But, the concept faces two problems. Firstly, in the material world of physical objects, 
permanence and continuity are observed regardless of perceiving not being permanent 
nor continuous. Secondly, why do observers not have any influence on the perceiving 
things?  George Berkeley claims that the existence of physical objects depends on God’s 
perceiving things constantly. There is also a difference between physical and fictional 
objects. The former is generally perceived by God and sometimes by a man, the latter is 
‘perceived’ only by man. Idealists will say that ‘not only is the impression of mind-body 
causal interaction an illusion, but the material world is itself an illusion’.65  
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Chapter 2 
 
2.1. Philosophy and science. 
 
‘Consciousness: the having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term 
is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what 
consciousness means’.66  There is still no final answer what consciousness is. It is quite 
possible that comprehensive definition of the phenomenon requires theories of many 
types. Regardless of whether a single theoretical perspective or a synthetic and pluralistic 
approach is necessary to understand consciousness, it still remains the great mystery for 
people and represents the current gap in knowledge. It is a big challenge to explain how 
subjective or phenomenal consciousness fits into the objective world. Dualists claim that 
the mind is separate and distinct from the body, but that gives rise  to the problem of their 
mutual interaction. On the other hand, monists state that the subjective mind and the 
objective brain are united behind their appearances. The problem for materialism is to 
explain how something that appears so different such as mind and matter, can be 
identical. 
 
The mind-body problem shows how strongly philosophy, especially philosophy of the 
mind, is connected with science.  It is widely accepted that consciousness is considered 
mainly in the context of neurology and the mind-body problem belongs to the domain of 
neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, later broadened by behavioural science and 
cognitive science. While no objective scientific definition seems to be able to capture the 
essence of this phenomenon, it is still possible to give examples for what tends intuitively 
to be called consciousness or being conscious by these disciplines. Together they are 
bringing fresh insight to the problem. The relation between mind and body started to be 
tackled from a completely new point of view, since the philosophers (such as Penrose or 
Lockwood) have started to assimilate the implications of quantum physics (for example: 
quantum superposition or non-locality). But a problem occurs in that quantum mechanics 
is still just a theory and it is still not clear what influence and consequences it has for the 
understanding of minds. Nevertheless, quantum mechanics has initiated a reexamination 
of the views of brains and bodies so far. It may explain consciousness and give the 
answers to the age-old metaphysical questions on the relationship and parallelisms of 
body and mind.  
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Before discussing the contribution of quantum mechanics for the studies of consciousness 
and matter, the mutual relation between philosophy and science should be considered. 
Jean Piaget, a Swiss psychologist and philosopher, said that ‘philosophy takes up a 
rational position to the whole of reality’.67 His concept of ‘the whole of reality’ consists of 
three components. Firstly, the higher activities of man (such as moral, aesthetic, religious 
or humanist faith). Next, knowledge that implies the existence of an ultimate reality, an 
absolute or a thing in itself. Thirdly, the reflections on the whole of reality being able to 
cause insight into the realm of possibility.68 Piaget claims that all, from the biggest 
systems in history of philosophy, including those that gave the beginning for other 
systems and which continue to have a permanent influence on human thoughts, have 
arisen from the reflections on scientific discoveries. It does not matter if those reflections 
were made by people personally involved in scientific discoveries, or rather applied to 
scientific revolution that took place in their days or epoch directly preceding. In the whole 
history of philosophy two important tendencies are noticeable. The first is made up of 
problems concerning life and its sense with reference to the whole reality. This tendency 
is constant in contrast to the second which is variable. Our resources of knowledge of the 
world make up the second tendency. Our knowledge is constantly changing, which simply 
means that philosophy also has to be changed. Thus, the origin of mathematics had 
influence on Plato’s system. Both biology and  logic affected Aristotle. Cartesian thought 
has its beginnings in analytical geometry and algebra, whereas Newtonian physics were 
formulated the system of Immanuel Kant. It seems to be obvious, that history and 
sociology had a huge influence on the systems of Hegel and Karol Marx. This is also the 
case in Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, in turn: the distinguished physicist and 
anesthesiologist, who introduced quantum theory to the phenomenon of consciousness. 
This theory may be necessary to understand the concept of consciousness, and both 
Penrose and Hameroff  
have written so extensively on the relevance of quantum theory to the 
understanding of consciousness. Their sincere and sustained effort to tie quantum 
mechanics to the specific workings of the brain in a manner permitting possible 
experimental tests is laudable and provides us with a chance to better understand 
how these seemingly disparate approaches might be unified.69  
 
Philosophy needs some kind of stimulus coming from outside for its development. When 
there is a new theoretical context, philosophy can start to search for an answer to the 
mysteries of existence. In a new theoretical context, parts of old answers considered as 
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true and possible became out of date, but in their place appears some new and the big 
mystery is seen in new light. Simultaneously, there appears new additional questions.70 
 
According to Piaget’s, Tractatus logico-philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein was the first 
book inspired by mathematical logic. Wittgenstein claimed that philosophy can never be a 
science and made quite a clear distinction between these two. Philosophy should clarify 
thoughts logically.  
 
Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially 
of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical 
prepositions”, but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and 
delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.71  
 
While science works within meaning and language, philosophy should be interested in the 
limits of meaning and language. ‘The business of philosophy is critique. It clarifies the 
limits of meaningful language. Science on the other hand consist of all true propositions. It 
studies the existence or nonexistence of states of affairs’.72 Philosophy should run up 
against the boundaries of language and make them comprehensible and clear.   
  
In his Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Wittgenstein claims that statements about good and 
bad or about the reality and the essence of existence can be called ‘metaphysics’. 
However, by the end of his book, from thesis 6.1 to 6.5 he claims that anything which is 
metaphysical cannot be reasonably described. We cannot get to know anything new 
about the essence of existence from logic – ‘6.1 The prepositions of logic are tautologies’ 
and it is the same situation with the mathematical laws – ‘6.24 The method by which 
mathematics arrives at its equations is the method of substitution. For equations express 
the substitutability of two expressions, and we proceed from a number of equations to new 
equations, replacing expressions by others in accordance with the equations’.73, 74 
Moreover, biology and the laws of nature seem to be also redundant and not helpful at all 
in searching for the essence of the world. However, there is also thesis 6.522: ‘There is 
indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical’.75 Everything that exists in 
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our world, can be described. Everything that can be described, exists. Everything that is 
mystical, cannot be described and thereby – do not belong to the world.  According to 
Wittgenstein, if there is any absolute value, it has to be somewhere ‘outside’. This value 
does not belong to our world. That is the reason, why nobody has found it already, despite 
the fact that a lot of people have tried to. If the absolute value or answers to problems of 
life do not belong to the world, neither philosophy nor science can give us an answer or 
solve them. They are things which cannot be described and determined. And ‘7. Whereof 
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’.76  
 
Wittgenstein wrote that, 
 
The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be 
said [...] and then always, when someone else wished to say something 
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he has given no meaning to certain signs 
in his prepositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other [...] but it would 
be the only strictly correct method.77  
 
For Wittgenstein philosophy can never be a science. It looks at things that are not 
scientific facts, and what is more, things that cannot even be verified. The ethical 
propositions show but cannot say, they represent attitude towards the world. In that case, 
they cannot be explained by the use of scientific method. Thus, even if people find 
answers for all scientific questions, problems of life remain untouched, because they do 
not belong to the scientific domain and cannot be solved scientifically.  
 
On the other side, the development of the science, especially new physics, makes it 
similar to philosophy to a large extent. There is a gradual movement from the empirical 
laws to the explanatory theories, and then to the theories unifying wider and wider fields of 
physics that encompass more phenomena and reach to the deeper and more general 
aspects of reality. Finally, contemporary cosmology is inseparably connected with physics. 
Moreover, in the context of discovery, physics starts by using the hypothetic and 
deductive method while formulating theories, not the inductive method. There is more and 
more space for speculations, since these theories cannot be derived from experiments. In 
the context of justification, it appears that theories in physics are not verifiable nor 
conclusively falsifiable, but only confirmable. With the progress of physics, the 
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disproportion between the development of theories and possibilities of their experimental 
testing came to the fore.78 The development of quantum theory requires ‘abandonment of 
the age-old ambition of calculating with certainty every detail of the behaviour of any 
system’.79 This is the case of programmes searching for the quantum gravity and theories 
unifying quantum mechanics with general theory of relativity, where the confirmations are 
mathematically coherent, but it is possible to justify only the fragments or some aspects of 
these theories. Furthermore, in the new physics, there are fields not confirmable in 
principle, such as the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. They are not 
confirmable to the same extent as metaphysics in philosophy.80  
       
The new physics deals with the fundamental, deep and the most general aspects and 
features of reality. Together with contemporary cosmology, it aims to give the most 
adequate description of the world as integrity. ‘The revolution in modern physics has been 
hailed as a triumph for the “no nonsense” philosophical approach of “positivism” and 
“operationalism”, but there have also been much publicized claims that modern physics is 
a vindication of such diverse theories as “subjective idealism”, “dialectical materialism”, 
“panpsychism”, and “Buddhist metaphysics”’.81 There is of course a need for critical 
examination and search for consistency with the aspiration to an understanding of the 
nature of things. Before Aristotle made the distinction between philosophy as a study of 
being and physics as an empirical reflection of nature, the subject of philosophy and 
physics was identical. Nowadays, when methods in the new physics are changing, and as 
at the advanced level it is becoming more and more speculative, it seems to be becoming 
even more closely connected with philosophy.   
 
2.2. Substance and matter.  
 
The terms ‘substance’ and ‘matter’ have different meanings in philosophical and ordinary 
or scientific language. Usually, in everyday conversations, ‘substance’ is associated with 
the concept of matter and it means the material of which something was made (for 
example: wood, plastic or metal). Bertrand Russell explains that  
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common sense thinks of the physical world as composed of ‘things’ which persist 
through a certain period of time and move in space. Philosophy and physics 
developed the notion of ‘thing’ into that of ‘material substance’, and thought of 
material substance as consisting of particle, each very small, and each persisting 
throughout all time.82  
 
Thus, matter is anything that exists in a space and possesses mass, and is distinct from 
the mind. While ‘in mythology and early science mind and matter are hardly separated, 
and matter is seen as alive and intelligent’, the development of physics just deepens the 
distinction between the world of physical reality and the world of perceived experience, 
and ‘matter seems to be more and more different from mind’.83  
 
In Ancient Greece, philosophers were looking for arché, the primitive principle which 
directs the whole world and universe, that is the representation of the reason of all beings 
and at the same time their principle. The existence of this principle was postulated by The 
Ionian School (a type of Greek philosophy centered in Miletus, Ionia in the 6th and 5th 
centuries BC) and represented by such philosophers as a Thales, Anaximander, 
Anaximenes or Heraclitus.84 First philosophical theories were characterized by the view, 
that everything that exists, has one common principle, the arché. For Thales it was water, 
for Empedocles the four elements (fire, water, air and earth) that composed all matter. In 
the fifth century BC Democritus began the doctrine of materialism by proposing the 
atomistic nature of matter. He suggested that matter is made up of eternal and 
indestructible units – atoms. Democritus hypothesized that the atoms themselves are 
unchanging, and they have ‘fixed properties such as size and shape, but they could move 
about in space and combine together in various ways, so that the macroscopic bodies 
which they constitute might seem to alter’.85 This made possible the notion of permanence 
and the state of flux at the same time – all changes were attributed to the rearrangements 
of unchanging atoms.  
 
However, the idea of Democritus was just a philosophical conception of the nature of 
reality. It was not based on any empirical data or observations. In fact, ‘for centuries, 
materialism had to compete with other ideas – for example, with the belief that matter 
possessed magical or active qualities, or could be infused with vitalistic potency or occult 
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forces’.86 The majority of these beliefs were removed from atomistic theories in the 
seventeenth century, particularly after the publication of Newton’s Principia in 1687. The 
Newtonian image of nature ‘had established a clear connection between cause and effect, 
and the mechanistic account required that matter moves in accordance with strict 
mathematical laws. There was no room for mysterious active qualities’.87 The atomistic 
theory had been developed further through the works of Antoine Lavoisier and John 
Dalton and transformed chemistry and physics into exact science. Nevertheless, the rise 
of quantum theory brought the laws of chance and unclear conjunctions of waves and 
particles into the deterministic and clockwork image of the Newtonian universe. According 
to quantum field theory, solid matter can dissolve away and be replaced by vibrations of 
invisible field energy. It leads to the superstring theory ‘which seeks to unite space, time 
and matter, and to build all of them from the vibrations of sub-microscopic loops of 
invisible string inhabiting a ten-dimensional imaginary universe’.88 Thus, ‘quantum physics 
undermines materialism because it reveals that matter has far less “substance” than we 
might believe’.89 
 
Despite the fact that seventeenth century science (especially the rise of classical physics) 
legitimized the atomistic image of world, Spinoza continued the philosophical tradition of 
Parmenides and his holistic belief in a single substance. With the development of 
quantum theory, Spinoza’s views seem far more appropriate. Before presenting Spinoza’s 
understanding of the notion ‘substance’, the general philosophical meaning of ‘substance’ 
and the understanding of the term by two predecessors of Spinoza – Aristotle and 
Descartes needs to be explained.  
  
In philosophy, there are two different way of explaining the notion of ‘substance’. The first 
is more general and according to this, the term ‘substance’ is derived from Greek ousia. 
Ousia is the third person singular feminine present participle of the verb ‘be’, that was 
transmitted via the Latin substantia with the meaning ‘something that stands under or 
grounds things’.90 According to this definition, substance appears in almost every 
philosophical system and represents the fundamental or the foundational entities of 
reality. This means, an atom is the substance for an atomist because it represents the 
basic thing from which everything is constructed, and Forms are the substances for Plato, 
because everything derives their existence from them.  
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Probably the only theories which do not would be those forms of logical positivism 
or pragmatism which treat ontology as a matter of convention. According to such 
theories, there are no real facts about what is ontologically basic, and so nothing is 
objectively substance.91  
 
The second way of explaining the meaning of ‘substance’ is more specific. It states that  
 
substances are a particular kind of basic entity, and some philosophical theories 
acknowledge them and others do not. According to this usage, it is a live issue 
whether the fundamental entities are substances or something else, such as 
events, or properties located at space-times.92  
 
This conception is connected to the notion of individual things or objects and the manner 
this notion is understood may be as a basic notion or it must be characterized in more 
fundamental terms. 
 
The difficulty with understanding Spinoza’s writings is his vocabulary. This has its origin in 
scholasticism, which in turn has its origin in Aristotle. The seventeenth century use of 
‘substance’ runs back to Aristotle, who considers this notion mainly in the Categories and 
Metaphysics Z. Aristotle was probably the most outstanding pupil of Plato. However, he 
did not continue Plato’s teaching of Forms and Ideas. Aristotle attached importance to 
cognition and empirical experiences. Something like ‘idea’ could not exist in Aristotle’s 
world as it was too general. He claims that the idea had to be the pattern for too many 
subjects. For example, the idea of ‘dog’ had to describe the infinite amount of different 
dogs, which is impossible to imagine, or it leads to the conclusion that every single dog 
has its own idea – which breaks the theory of ideas, because from the conception they 
have to be something general. According to Aristotle, the knowledge of the subject comes 
from itself or is even included in it.93  
 
After rejecting Plato’s conception, Aristotle had to find something to ‘fill up the gap’, 
because something that makes subjects to be what they are, has to exist necessarily. If 
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ideas are not almost impossible to know (at least empirically), and all subjects are 
individual, the answer lies in themselves. The knowledge of subject comes from the 
analysis of its characteristics, from the empirical experience supported with logical 
reasoning. There is implication that the essence of the subject is  inseparably connected 
to it. Or even more, there is no characteristic or part of this subject that is more important 
than this one that decided on its existence and on what this subject is.94 Aristotle stated 
that fundamental part of the being is present in it and called it ‘substance’. The definitions 
of substance appears in Metaphysics, where they are ‘items that can be subjects of 
predication and can undergo change, i.e., they can maintain an identity while having 
mutually contradictory properties at different times’ and it is enriches in the Categories 
with the clause ‘[…] which cannot be predicated of anything else’.95 
 
Aristotelian definition of substance is essentially connected with the notion of 
independence and identity. A substance is a subject of a predicate, but simultaneously is 
not a predicate of anything else. And a substance can have different predicates attached 
to it and undergo different changes, however, it holds onto its identity. These two very 
important parts of the definition of substance – independence and identity – are present in 
Spinoza’s understanding of this term. This ‘substance’ which is used by Descartes, and 
then even more by Spinoza and Leibniz, is derived from Aristotle’s Categories.96  
 
There are some basic differences between Spinoza’s and Descartes’ understanding of 
substance. The system used by Spinoza belongs to traditions started by Parmenides – 
there is only one substance, while  
 
Descartes admitted three substances, God, and mind and matter; it is true that 
even for him, God was, in a sense, more substantial than mind and matter, since 
he had created them, and could, if he chose, annihilate them.97  
 
In fact, we can say, that Descartes distinguished two kind of substance: infinite substance 
– God, and created or finite substances that together with properties or qualities make up 
three levels of reality. Substance is known through attributes and for Descartes there are 
two main attributes that can explain all the possible modes (properties or qualities) – 
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extension and thought. Spinoza claims, that there is one substance which has infinite 
attributes, so both extension and thought are attributes of God, while ‘for Descartes, 
extension is the essence of matter’.98   
 
Spinoza considers the notion of substance in his book Ethics. Ethics is very organized and 
clear with its geometrical structure. Every definition expresses logical and true idea. Using 
these true ideas and deducing logical conclusion, it is not possible to make mistakes. 
Spinoza writes that ‘the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things’.99 Logical deduction of conclusions from the definitions and axioms is 
at the same time deduction that brings knowledge about the world. Ethics begins with the 
argumentation of the nature of the substance.  
 
Spinoza defines substance as ‘that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in 
other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other 
conception’.100 Substance understood in this manner is causa sui – cause of itself. To 
prove this, Spinoza put together the definition of substance with the axiom stating that 
knowledge of the effect depends on the knowledge of the cause.101 If the substance was 
made by something else (so it would not be causa sui), then, according to this axiom, to 
get to know this substance, it would be necessary to get to know its cause. However, this 
leads to nonsense. In a situation like this, substance could not be substance, which 
(according to definition) is cause of itself, and it is not comprehended by some other 
cause. Thus, substance is dependent only on itself and its existence does not depend on 
any other exterior cause.          
 
Substance exists. According to the author of Ethics, it can be proved using the definition 
of cause of itself. By cause of itself Spinoza means that, what essence includes existence 
and what nature can be comprehended only as existing.102 Substance, being causa sui, 
has to exist out of necessity.  
 
Substance, according to Spinoza, is infinite. To prove this, he calls the definition a finite 
thing. This definition advocates that this thing is finite, which can be limited by the other 
                                                          
98
 ibid., p. 565. 
99
 Spinoza, B., The Ethics (Teddington: The Echo Library, 2006), p. 28. [P.II, Prop. vii.] 
100
 ibid., p. 1. [P.I, Def. III] 
101
 ibid. [P.I, Ax. IV] 
102
 ibid. [P.I, Def. I] 
39 
 
thing of the same nature. Two things with different natures do not have anything in 
common, so they cannot limit themselves. For instance, the body is not limited by thought, 
neither thought by body. It results from this, that the substance could be limited only by 
another substance of the same nature, attribute (by attribute Spinoza means ‘that which 
the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance’).103 However, in the 
opinion of Spinoza, this would be preposterous, since it is not possible to distinguish two 
substances with the same attributes. As having the same attributes makes two 
substances indistinguishable, that is a nonsense to treat them as two – they are just one 
and the same. Since there cannot be two or more substances having the same nature (so 
they could limit themselves and be finite from definition), substance has to be infinite. On 
the other hand, Descartes makes a split between infinite and finite substance, thus he is 
limiting God. God is separate and transcendent in relation to the world (the separation 
between the creator and that which is created), so if he is opposed to the created world 
(with its own independent existence), simultaneously he is limited. The problem with 
Descartes’ philosophy is the fact that he needs a theological definition of God, because 
without it, his whole metaphysics would collapse. On the other hand, according to 
Spinoza, God is immanent and not a transitive cause of things.   
 
Substance is indivisible. Spinoza argues that by considering consequences from the 
opposite standpoint, if it were true that substance is divisible, there are two possibilities. 
Firstly, substance is divided into parts that preserve its nature, or secondly, its nature will 
not belong to these parts. The first possibility has to be rejected, because as a result of 
the division few substances with the same nature would be received, and as it was 
already proved, the existence of substances like this is not possible. The second 
possibility also has to be rejected. If the parts of substance do not have its nature, then 
‘substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi) is also absurd’, and 
this contradicts the thesis of the existence of substance out of necessity.104  
 
For Descartes, there cannot be one substance. This would imply that God is extended. 
And according to Descartes, extended matter is divisible, which implies destruction and 
thus, an imperfection. However, Spinoza argues that divisibility does not have to mean 
destruction, because ‘there cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having 
                                                          
103
 ibid. [P.I, Def. IV] 
104
 ibid., p. 7. [P.I, Prop. xiii.] 
40 
 
the same nature or attribute’.105 For Spinoza, divisibility of matter is a mode, and in 
essence, matter is not divisible.            
 
Substance is God. Spinoza argues that the definition of God is ‘by God, I mean a being 
absolutely infinite – that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each 
express eternal and infinite essentiality’.106 The consequence of the above proposition 
explaining that except for God no substance can exist. The proof of this is in principle the 
replica of the proof of impossibility of existence of two or more substances. According to 
the definition, God has all attributes expressing substance, so if there were any other 
substance, it would have to be explained by some of God’s attributes. As a result, there 
would be two substances with the same attribute, which obviously cannot exist.  
 
For Spinoza, God is equal to Nature or World, while there is a split in being in the 
philosophy of Descartes. This split is caused by Descartes’ idea of creation. Spinoza 
rejects this split in his proposition: 
 
God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Proof. – All things 
which are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore 
(by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.107  
 
So put simply, God is not outside nature, God is nature.  Spinoza is not rejecting 
Descartes’ philosophy. He just takes Descartes’ metaphysics to its logical conclusion, 
rejecting a theological God and anthropomorphism.   
 
According to Spinoza, God-substance is eternal. As he writes, ‘by eternity, I mean 
existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition 
of that which is eternal’.108 As it is already known, to the nature of God-substance belongs 
existence. Thus, from the definition of God-substance, he exists. Putting this together with 
the definition of eternity, results in the thesis that God is eternal. However, this ‘eternity’ is 
equal to existence and it should not be mistaken for duration or very long time of duration 
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– eternity is existence out of time. Thus, substance is eternal and simultaneously 
atemporal.   
 
It is worth underlining the fact that the author of Ethics does not confine himself with 
showing the connection of existence to the essence of God, but he heads towards the 
direction of identifying these two things. ‘The existence of God and his essence are one 
and the same’ says Spinoza in his proposition.109 He starts with the statement that God is 
eternal. Since God is eternal, everyone with his attributes expresses the existence (which 
is based on the definition of eternity, which is the equal of existence). Using the other 
words from the definition expresses the essence of substance, and the substance is 
eternal, which means that expressing its essence also expresses its existence. Thus, the 
existence of God and his essence can be indentified – that which makes up the essence 
of God is the same as that which makes up his existence.      
 
God-substance comprehended in this manner is perfect. According to Spinoza, the 
category of perfection is connected with the category of existence. He claims that every 
individual thing tries to remain in own being, aims for self-preservation and remains in its 
existence. Something can be perfect absolutely only if it exists absolutely – something in 
which essence and existence are the same. This condition is fulfilled by God-substance.  
 
‘Spinoza defines God in terms of substance and he defines both substance and mode in 
terms of two other notions that are undefined: being in a thing and being conceived 
through a thing’.110 To sum up, God necessarily exists (Prop. xi.), God is unique (Prop. xiv. 
and Coroll. i., ii.), God acts solely from the necessity of his nature (Prop. xvi., Prop. xvii.), 
he is the free cause of all things (Prop. xvii. Coroll. ii.), all things are in God and depend 
on God (Prop. xv.) and all things are predetermined, no by God’s free will, but by God’s 
absolute nature (Prop. xvi., Prop. xxix., Prop. xxxii Coroll. i., Prop. xxxiii.).111    
 
That which reason gets to know of substance as determining its essence is called by 
Spinoza ‘attribute’. It has to be underlined that what Spinoza talks about is the essence of 
substance, not the substance itself – reason cannot get to know the substance in itself. 
One of the first propositions of the Ethics advocates is that ‘each particular attribute of one 
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substance must be conceived through itself’.112 The concept of an individual attribute 
cannot include in itself any other concepts, through which it could be linked to another 
attribute. For example, it is not possible to talk about attributes as ‘existing’. What is more, 
God is substance of an infinite number of attributes, which means that there is infinitely 
many attributes. Laura Weed points out that  
 
Mentality and Physicality are two of monistic Substance’s infinite attributes, 
according to Spinoza. Substance is not limited to these two attributes, but contains 
all attributes that are possible and conceivable by God, of which there are an 
infinite number.113 
 
Weed sees a resemblance of Spinoza’s attributes in the many-worlds interpretations of 
quantum physics developed by Hugh Everett. This interpretation is simply explained by 
John Gribbin as follows: 
  
Everett’s interpretation is that the overlapping wave functions of the whole 
universe, the alternative realities that interact to produce measurable interference 
at the quantum level, do not collapse. All of them are equally real, and exist in their 
own parts of ‘superspace’ (and supertime).114  
 
This means that when a measurement is taken at the quantum level, observation leads to 
the selection of one of these alternatives. Thus, one alternative becomes a part of the so 
called ‘real’ world. When this measurement is taken, all the alternatives are separated and  
 
each alternative reality containing its own observer who has made the same 
observation but got a different quantum ‘answer’ and thinks that he has ‘collapsed 
the wave function’ into one single quantum alternative.115 
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Weed suggests that Everett, like Spinoza, considers that ‘perspective, not causation, joins 
the inherently unrelated layers of reality into a monistic thing. Observers create local 
realities out of universal possibilities’.116    
 
Spinoza uses the same vocabulary as Descartes. In Descartes’ philosophy we also find 
attributes, the same as substance and modes.  
 
We learnt that a particular thing is a substance by first observing that it has some 
qualities and then interfering that it is a substance, by the premises that whatever 
has observed qualities is a substance: “if we perceive the presence of some 
attribute, we can infer that there must also be present an existing thing or substance 
to which it may be attributed.117  
 
Spinoza also defines ‘mode’. It is ‘the modification of substance, or that which exists in, 
and is conceived through, something other than itself’.118 Only substance and its modes 
exist in reality. Modes are in substance, the substance is their cause and it is not 
separated from them. However, they are not parts of infinite substance and substance is 
not the set of modes. It is important that they belong to the sphere natura naturata (nature 
created) and not to natura naturans (nature creating) – they do not have cause in 
themselves. Weed states that: 
 
Quantum mechanics proposes a universe in which epistemological access to 
information is skewed by the perspective of an observer. Each particle experiences 
the space-time of its own light cone, but particles moving in other light cone may 
not be accessible at all, or may be so only through black holes or worm holes, that 
radically alter whatever passes into them.119  
 
She compares that to the Spinoza’s human modes which knows only two attributes in 
which they participate – the physical and the mental. She claims that ‘we cannot even 
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know the manner of the unity that connects these two attributes within ourselves’ and later 
that ‘no human can see the whole of which we are a minute part’.120    
  
According to the author of Ethics, only substance exists necessarily and by its own 
self-sufficiency. The substance is the cause of itself, is eternal, infinite and 
indivisible. These and other features of the substance link together in determining 
themselves. Infinite God is identified with nature and includes in itself all beings, all 
reality. Whatever exists, is in God and nothing can exist or be comprehended 
without him.  
 
Although Spinoza identifies natura naturans with natura naturata, it should be 
remembered that natura naturans is the cause of the natura naturata. In other 
words, God being identified with nature, is at the same time the cause of its 
existence. The essence of things created by God-substance does not include 
existence, they cannot be the cause of themselves.  
   
What is interesting, with all the clarity of Spinoza’s argument, is that it seems that 
in a logical series of propositions the existence of finite modes does not have 
justification. In other words, it is difficult to find some clarification, which would 
explain the principle of moving from infinite substance to finite modes.    
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1. Quantum mechanics.  
 
The relationship between consciousness and matter has been analysed from a different 
point of view, since philosophers and scientists started to assimilate the implications of 
quantum physics. For example, David Hodgson states that mental and physical events 
are aspects of manifestations of the same events of the brain-mind and there are some 
discoverable correlations between them. He claims that macro-physical events of neural 
firings are aspects of micro events in the quantum world, which indicates that mental 
events are more closely related to quantum events than to the neural firings 
themselves.121 Similarly, Roger Penrose argues that quantum theory can be effectively 
applied to explain consciousness. His views are under the strong influence of the nature 
of creativity, mathematical insight and the idea of a Platonic reality beyond mind and 
matter. However, his non-algorithmic mathematical materialism is often criticised to be 
obscure and lacking in evidence.122 On the other hand, Amit Goswami applies quantum 
theory of consciousness to the mind-body problem in monistic idealism. Goswami’s views 
on quantum theory and monistic idealism are the combination of the aspects of quantum 
physics with the mental monist view that there is a living consciousness being which we 
take to be physical reality, but is in fact an emergent epiphenomenon. 123 
 
Our knowledge is changing, which simply means that philosophy also has to be changed. 
Since the development of quantum theory has very recently brought a fresh insight into 
the science, some of the theories of the mind and the body correlation should be 
reconsidered. However, this project deals more with the implications of science for the 
philosophy of mind and mind-body problem than the science itself.   
 
Quantum mechanics arose as a new branch of physics at the beginning of the 20th 
century. ‘Quantum’ means a particular amount, the smallest particle of physical 
entity that can be changed in an interaction. ‘Mechanics’ is the branch of 
knowledge which considers the behaviour of physical bodies under the influence 
of forces or displacements. It is simply the study of movement. Thus, quantum 
mechanics is concerned with examination of movements of particles. Quantum 
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theory claims that nature is made of quanta and quantum mechanics which 
studies this phenomenon.124  
 
What is important, quantum mechanics does not replace Newtonian physics; it is 
just its peculiar case. Thus, there is no need for complete abandonment of 
classical physics. While Newtonian laws work well for the observable world and 
can still be applied to objects on a big scale, quantum mechanics helps to 
understand that this view of nature is not enough to explain everything that can be 
observed, and there has to be worked out new, broaden outlook. For example, 
there is not natural place for consciousness in classical physics. It describes the 
physical universe with the use of particles and local fields that are governed in 
time and space by  certain laws of motion. This system is ‘logically complete in the 
sense that it does not logically require, for its description of nature, any things 
beyond the dispositions of the particles and local fields’.125   
 
It has to be underlined, that there is a widely misunderstood idea of the application 
of quantum mechanics:  
 
It is sometimes suggested that quantum theory governs only the behaviour 
of very small things – like electrons. If quantum theory tells us that these 
things will behave strangely, that should not concern us. The behaviour of 
very small things ‘averages out’ in the familiar observable world of medium-
sized objects.126  
 
However attractive it might seem, it is not true. Quantum mechanics studies the 
invisible world of atoms, but they are the basis and building material of the whole 
universe and they govern everything around. Quantum effects cannot be 
separated from the everyday world, because they are part of it. Quantum theory 
‘tells us that a physicist who observes an electron go into a particular quantum 
state, himself goes into that state, and so does everything in a physicist’s world’.127 
What is more, Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (named after the 
physicist Neils Bohr, whose work was mostly conducted in Copenhagen) claims 
that what is described by quantum mechanics is not important, and certainly it 
does not aim at providing a picture of the physical world itself. What is really 
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substantial, quantum theory is about the correlation between various observations 
and what can be observed in specific conditions. Bohr and Heisenberg, the 
principal founders of quantum theory, insisted that ‘the theory must, strictly 
speaking, be viewed as merely a set of rules for making predictions about 
observations obtained under certain special kinds of experimental conditions’.128 
According to Copenhagen interpretation, it is important that quantum mechanics 
works in all possible experimental situations.129  
 
Quantum mechanics is a real challenge to materialism, because ‘it reveals that 
matter has far less “substance” than we might believe’, and secondly, because 
according to it, the observer makes a difference to what is observed.130 Erwin 
Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment is confirmation of this thesis.  
 
A cat, Tibbles, is locked in a tight box, in which there is a radioactive substance 
and Geiger-Müller counter. When the radioactive decay of a radium atom begins, 
the counter will activate the mechanism with poison sufficient to kill the cat. It has 
to be supposed, that in the time in which the experiment is carried out, radioactive 
decay may happen with 50% probability and with the same probability it may not 
happen. Quantum mechanics governs the decay, which means that the 
radioactive atomic nucleus is in a state of superposition of the state responsible for 
decay and the state without decay. If the Geiger-Müller counter records the decay, 
the poisonous substance is released and Tibbles dies. However, decay occurs 
with 50% probability, which means that the cat is dead or alive with 50% 
probability. According to Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the 
state of the cat will be determined only after carrying out the measurement – 
looking into the box. The cat’s wave function will collapse – it will contract to the 
state of alive cat or dead cat. Until that time, Tibbles is in a quantum state of 
superposition: a mixture of life and death.131  
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Quantum superposition defines the collection of all possible states that an object 
can have. ‘The world is in a superposition of states until it is observed’.132 This is 
colloquially known as ‘consciousness causes collapse’ – a conscious observer 
carrying out observations makes the wave function collapse.  This means, the 
world can be in any configuration and any possible arrangement of particles or 
fields. Thus, quantum theory ‘seems to place minds outside the material world. If 
minds were themselves parts of material world, they would be […] merely parts of 
the whole system, hence themselves in a superposition of states’.133 What is more, 
any consciousness can reduce the quantum states. Nevertheless, the more 
primitive would be the conscious organism, its power would be less in causing the 
collapse of the wave function. In the case of Schrödinger’s experiment, ‘the cat’s 
awareness of the click of the Geiger counter or the breaking of the poison 
container would (assuming error-free connection to the micro observable) 
eliminate the potentiality of no-decay of the radioactive substance – although the 
cat would not know this’.134 
 
Contrary to Newtonian physics, quantum mechanics shows that knowledge of the 
subatomic world lies far away from what is supposed to be true. Furthermore, it is not 
possible to predict atomic phenomena. The only thing that can be predicted is its 
probability. ‘Quantum theory is a procedure by which scientists predict probabilities that 
measurement of specified kinds will yield results of specified kinds in situations of 
specified kinds’.135 From a philosophical point of view, quantum mechanics causes 
important implications. For example, it not only comes out against determinism and claims 
that people have influence on the reality around them, but it states that people create 
reality to some extent. The nature of particles allows the observer to know its momentum 
or position, but never these two quantities at the same time. This means that the observer 
has to decide which of these two features to measure. From the metaphysical side, the 
observer creates some of the particle’s properties, because he has decided to measure 
them. Or differently, something that has position (for: example a particle) is created 
because there is an observer who wants to determine its position and it is impossible to 
determine the position, if there is nothing, that can be in this position.136 In the beginning 
there was nothing. Somehow from this nothing came everything. Out of this nothingness 
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matter, energy, space, time, consciousness, mind emerged. How is it that something as 
unconscious as the matter of the brain can ever give rise to something as immaterial as 
experience? A well-known physicist at Princeton, John Wheeler, wrote in his Gravitation:  
 
May the universe in some strange sense be ‘brought into being’ by the 
participation of those who participate? […] The vital act is the act of participation. 
‘Participator’ is the incontrovertible new concept given by quantum mechanics. It 
strikes down the term ‘observer’ of classical theory, the man who stands safely 
behind the thick glass wall and watches what goes on without taking part. It cannot 
be done, quantum mechanics says.137  
 
That is the point, where new physics with quantum mechanics in the front starts to be very 
similar to eastern mysticism.  
 
According to the measurement problem, an atom only appears in a particular place if it is 
measured. In other words, an atom is spread out all over the place, until the conscious 
observer decides to look at it. Thus, the act of measurement or observation creates the 
entire universe. Only conscious beings can be observers, then ultimately becoming 
strongly connected to the very existence of reality. Without them there will be only this 
expanding superposition of possibilities without anything definite ever really happening. 
However, ‘until the measurement is made, all the possible results remain possible: so the 
question arises, at what stage in a process of measurement can it be said that the 
measurement is actually made, so that a particular result becomes actual and the other 
possibilities are eliminated?’.138 The physicist Eugene Wigner suggested that ‘it only 
occurs when the person making the measurement actually becomes conscious of the 
result’.139 
    
Consciousness that causes collapse brings clear indication between ‘observed 
system’ and ‘observing systems’. ‘If measurement is effected by the first 
registration on human consciousness, then it is not surprising that the 
mathematics of quantum physics, dealing with the objective world, does not 
represent it’.140 However, there are three problems with this viewpoint.  
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Firstly, as has already been said, the act of observation creates and determines 
the results. Nevertheless, ‘to avoid solipsism, on the one hand, and different 
values of observables being disclosed to different persons, on the other hand, one 
has to suppose that registration of a measurement on the consciousness of one 
person reduces the state so as to show a definite value so far as everyone is 
concerned’.141 Thus, if one observer opens Schrödinger’s box and affirms that the 
cat is dead, he has to make that fact the only possible result for everybody else 
who looks into the box. The question is, how one consciousness can influence 
other consciousnesses and cause the collapse of the state for both of them.  
 
Secondly, it has to be considered, that the first person that opens box judges the 
state of the cat wrongly (for example: the cat is sleeping, while considered to be 
dead). ‘Surely the observation which is thereby mistaken does not determine the 
value to which the state collapses; and equally surely it could not reduce the state 
to the correct value which is not observed’.142 Thus, how is the accuracy 
determined when measuring observation.  
  
Finally, what happens in a situation when the measurement is taken by some sort 
of machine. ‘A measuring instrument is applied to a system, no one looks at the 
reading, but two photographs are taken, one after the other. A person then looks 
at the second photograph taken’.143 Can this measuring device cause collapse of 
the wave function? ‘It seems prima facie implausible that some one of these three 
events could reduce the state function for all persons and all purposes’.144  
 
The objective solution to the problem of measurement consists of indeterminism 
and the ‘non-materiality’ of matter. According to indeterminism, all physical 
measurements, Newtonian laws or physical phenomena cannot bring permanent 
views of the world and cannot predict the events. They can only give probabilities 
for individual micro events and, moreover, ‘that does not necessarily involve 
indeterminism for macro events, it can do so’.145 In addition, the function of the 
‘non-material’ views of matter does not deny the existence of macro objects and 
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macro events of people’s experience, but rather suggests that ‘in certain respect 
their fundamental nature is not as we assume it to be’.146  
 
What is more, Michael Lockwood, considering quantum mechanics and the conscious 
observer, suggests that one of the possible philosophical consequences for the 
measurement problem is the abandonment of realism. For example, the Schrödinger’s cat 
experiment fails to satisfy the common-sense intuitions, where the cat must be dead or 
alive regardless of the actions of the observer. Because realism ‘is the view that reality 
transcends experience, that propositions can be true or false, independently of our being 
in a position to tell which they are’.147 The limitations of our physical knowledge that could 
lead from realism to idealism, would be considered together with the discussion on the 
monistic idealism suggested by Amit Goswami in the section 7.4. of this chapter.  
 
On the other hand, Huw Price in his article ‘A Neglected Route to Realism about Quantum 
Mechanics’ underlines the philosophical meaning of Bell’s Theorem and also tries to 
reconcile the existence of the ‘metaphysical advantages’ such as locality and Einsteinian 
realism to the existence of the free will.148 Price is an Australian philosopher and physicist, 
who mostly considers asymmetry of the time and the philosophy of physics and 
pragmatism in his works. He says that ‘nature has offered us a metaphysical choice of an 
almost Faustian character. We may choose to enjoy the metaphysical good life in 
quantum mechanics, keeping locality, realism, and special relativity – but only so long as 
we are prepared to surrender our belief in free will!’.149 
 
Price states that ‘an exceptionally promising route to a satisfying resolution of some of the 
most profound puzzles in the history of science lies unexplored and almost unnoticed’.150 
The author’s intention is to explain how to avoid the challenge to local realism made up by 
Bell’s Theorem and show the significant consequences it brings for both physicists and 
philosophers. According to Price, this can be achieved by reinterpreting the formal 
possibilities in terms of backward causation.  
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Instead of taking the prior state of the physical system in question to ‘constrain’ the 
experimenter’s choice, we may reasonably take the latter’s choice to affect the 
prior state of the physical system. The mathematics thus remain the same as in 
Bell’s proposal, but we give it a different metaphysical gloss.151  
 
Price admits that the backward causation in quantum mechanics is still a rather unpopular 
view and in his article he also tries to diagnose and treat this intuitive resistance. 
However, he underlines that the article is ‘not offering the formal details of an 
interpretation or extensions of quantum mechanics which embodies these ideas’.152 The 
aim of the article is to try to clear away some difficulties of quantum mechanics not in the 
technical, but in the conceptual sense.     
 
Firstly, the author accesses  ‘the first-order case for the backward causation approach’. 
He starts with a rather informal account of Bell’s Theorem and the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen Paradox on which it is based. Price says that Einstein – as a supporter of realism – 
wanted to prove that the measurement problem in quantum mechanics was merely 
epistemological. According to the author,  
 
he disliked the Copenhagen view that the nature of reality could depend on what 
humans choose to observe, and believed that the features of quantum mechanics 
that Bohr and others took as evidence of deep entanglement between observation 
and reality were really a reflection of the fact that the theory gives only a partial 
description of reality. As he saw, the crucial question is therefore whether the 
quantum mechanical description of reality can be considered to be complete.153  
 
Using the thought EPR experiment, it was concluded that the quantum theory cannot be 
complete, mainly because quantum variables need to have been established values 
before any measurement, while quantum mechanics gives only probabilities of the values. 
However, Bell’s Theorem shows that the manner in which quantum mechanics predicts is 
different from classical intuition and no physical theory of hidden variables can reproduce 
all of the predictions of quantum mechanics. Bell proved that the EPR Paradox never 
really existed because from the very beginning it was internally contradictory.  
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Moreover, Price considers Doppelgänger’s Twin Paradox and its relation with the notion of 
free will. Since in this example, according to ‘the principle of the relativity of simultaneity, 
there was no determinate sense in which one interrogation took place before the other. 
How then could it be a determinate matter of whether interrogation 1 influenced 
interrogation 2, or vice versa?’.154 If it is considered that twins do not possess the power of 
telepathy, but precognition of what questions they are to be asked, it deprives the police of 
the freedom to choose what questions to ask. However, Price suggests using advanced 
action in this case and interpret it in terms of backward causation with the use of Bell’s 
Theorem that seemingly denies free will. He opts for the case where hidden variables 
depends both on the fate and the history of the agents concerned. The author says that  
 
this advanced action proposal does not conflict with special relativity. This is 
because the point at which twins become coupled – whether their conception, their 
birth, or some later meeting – lies well within the light-cones of both their later 
interrogations. The effect is not instantaneous and not at a space-like distance. 
And it needs no mysterious carrier. It has the twins themselves, who bear the 
marks of their future as they bear the marks of their past.155 
 
There are two main objections to the advanced action interpretation. First, it is a new 
version of ‘bilking argument’, which Price treats very briefly and disproves by saying, that 
even if something is ‘already determined/written’ it does not mean it is ‘accessible’. 
Secondly, there is the fatalist objection, which can be briefly summarised by the sentence 
that ‘there is a set of true propositions about the future and there is no human able to 
prevent it from occurring, thus everything that will happen in the future is already 
unavoidable’. Nevertheless, there are sometimes propositions about the future that are 
neither true nor false and it is possible for a proposition to have different truth values at 
different times, even if, Price says that modern physicists have more than enough reasons 
to reject that possibility.156  
 
Price claims that ‘the relationship between causation and physical theory is itself obscure 
and philosophically problematic, it is very far from obvious what the backward causation 
proposal actually amounts to, in physical terms’.157 According to the notion of backward 
causality, the effect precedes its cause temporally, but not causally. Thus the concept of 
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backward causality assumes a mere contingent feature and cause and effect may reverse 
their order.158 The majority of the attempts to interpret quantum mechanics has discarded 
the notion of causality or causal chains, mostly because of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle. ‘Although the uncertainty relations had been derived from the fundamental 
equations of quantum mechanics, some influential experts began to teach quantum theory 
by starting out from the uncertainty relations’.159  
 
Nevertheless, there is a number of experiments in quantum mechanics that consider 
backward causation, not only as a possibility to happen, but even as the logical 
explanation of the results given. Firstly, the famous Double – Slip Experiment by Thomas 
Young, where particles passing through two closely spaced slits are found to interfere with 
each other and with the observer. ‘The electrons not only know whether or not both holes 
are open, they know whether or not we are watching them, and they adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. There is no clearer example of the interaction of the observer with the 
experiment’ claims scientist John Gribbin.160 Secondly, the more recent experiment with 
Bell’s Theorem interpretation – Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser by Yoon-Ho Kim. This 
investigates further the peculiar consequences of Young’s experiment. There is a 
sophisticated device prepared to: 
 
measure correlated pairs of photons, which are in an entangled state, so that one 
of the two photons is detected 8 nanoseconds before its partner. The results of the 
experiment are quite amazing. They seem to indicate that the behavior of the 
photons detected these 8 nanoseconds before their partners is determined by how 
the partners will be detected.161  
 
And finally, the effect called backward masking mentioned by Roger Penrose. Penrose 
describes a situation, in which electrical stimulation is applied to the skin. If this stimulus 
lasts shorter than half a second, it is not perceived. However, ‘a cortical stimulus can 
“backward mask” an earlier skin stimulus, indicating that awareness of the skin stimulus 
had actually not yet taken place by the time of the cortical stimulus. If a skin stimulus is 
applied shortly after such a cortical stimulus, then skin awareness is “referred back” but 
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the cortical awareness is not’.162 Thus simply put, the subject seems to refer the 
perception of the stimulus touching skin backwards in time by about half a second.    
 
Despite this fact, quantum mechanics does not consider that backward causation is 
consistent with this theory. What is more, ‘the causal chain moving backward in time is 
able to explain the non-locality in quantum mechanics, consistent with the special 
relativity’.163 The best way to explain it, is to use the EPR experiment once again. Firstly, 
two or more particles are in close connection with each other and when they are 
separated, their measured values of certain observables are correlated. In the cases,  
 
where the measurements are space-like events, special relativity prohibits a causal 
chain going directly through space-time from one to the other. This suggests that 
these measured values were a reality (or at least determined) prior to 
measurement, and that the stochastic measurement was not the deterministic 
cause of the observed reality.164  
 
This implies the existence of hidden variables that determines the reality before the 
measurement is taken. However, there is no hidden variable the quantum mechanics that 
can explain the connections of the measurement taken (through the constraints of the 
locality condition of special relativity). What is more,  
 
no hidden variable theory can explain the correlation is because of the free choice 
of the experimenters in separable choosing of the observable of each particle to 
become a reality. In summary, no causal chain of contiguous events, even 
including hidden variables, can explain this correlation, assuming all causal chains 
move forward in time.  Hence, the EPR correlation is called a paradox.165  
 
Moreover, it is solved by backward causation. And what is even more important, ‘the EPR 
correlations are probabilistic rather than deterministic. This implies probabilistic 
causation’.166 That could also be the next argument in favour of indeterminism and free 
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will. For, neither the quantum theory nor Bell’s Theorem raise any new difficulties for the 
notion of free will. Furthermore, Bell’s Theorem ‘offers us a route to an Einsteinian realism 
about quantum mechanics which is local, and therefore compatible with special relativity; 
and which shares the well known advantages of the Einsteinian view that quantum 
mechanics is incomplete’.167        
 
3.2.  Non-algorithmic Mathematical Materialism.  
 
Roger Penrose, English mathematical physicist, argues that quantum theory can be 
effectively applied to explain consciousness. His views are under the strong influence of 
the nature of creativity, mathematical insight, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and the 
idea of a Platonic reality beyond mind and matter.  
 
To understand the place of the mind in the Penrose’ ontology and the perspective with 
which he looks at the mind-body problem, the concept of the three worlds needs to be 
presented. The first of the worlds distinguished by Penrose is the world of the 
mathematical ideas of Plato. Mathematical beings, such as natural numbers, Turing 
machines, Einstein field equations or Mandelbrot sets, truly exist in that world, 
independently of the experiencing subject. To put it another way, that world is not created 
by the mathematicians, but it has an objective character and can be explored by the 
human mind, which makes a sense for the existence of the term ‘objective mathematical 
truth’. Penrose, a supporter of mathematical Platonism, claims that  
 
the mathematical assertions that can belong to Plato’s world are precisely those 
that are objectively true. Indeed, I would regard mathematical objectivity as really 
what mathematical Platonism is all about. To say that some mathematical 
assertion has a Platonic existence is merely to say that it is true in an objective 
sense.168  
 
To that world also belong the ideas of goodness, truth and beauty.  
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From that mathematical world, which exists beyond space and time, emerges the physical 
world, which can be described by exact science. The fact that the second world comes 
from the mathematical one is very important for Penrose, who treats it as proof for the 
hypothesis that the whole universe has a mathematical basis governing its structure very 
precisely by the use of timeless mathematical laws.169 There is also the third world – the 
world of the mind. It includes phenomena such as consciousness, understanding or 
intelligence. According to Penrose, all mental events have their ultimate justification in the 
physical world (physicalism). 
 
The concept of the three worlds brings the three mysteries: in what way the physical world 
emerges from the ideal world of the mathematics; how conscious minds can come into 
being in the physical world; and what provides for our minds the access to the world of 
ideas that is beyond time and space. What is the most important element of these 
concepts, is the assumption that every subsequent world emerges from a part of the 
previous. As an effect, the physical world comes from only the part of the rich 
mathematical world, and the world of mind emerges only from some structures of the 
physical world (responsible for the structure of the brain). Thus, only a small unit of mental 
activity considers the absolute ideas for the platonic world. What is more, Penrose claims 
that there are no mathematical truths belonging to the platonic world and no available for 
the conscious mind. He claims that: 
 
the more we understand about the physical world, and the deeper we probe into 
the laws of nature, the more it seems as though the physical world almost 
evaporates and we are left only with mathematics. The deeper we understand the 
laws of physics, the more we are driven into this world of mathematics and 
mathematical concepts.170  
 
According to Penrose, the world of mathematics is the most basic grounds for reality and 
the physical world is not just an imperfect copy of the world of ideas.   
 
Every following world, emerging from the part of the previous, is richer. Thus, the most 
complex and the richest is the world of the mind. However, Penrose does not consider 
these worlds to be separated from each other, but rather that they make up the part of 
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some mysterious and more complicated integrity. Furthermore, he assumes that it is not 
possible to understand one of these three areas without evoking the other two. They 
should be unified within the confines of the formalism of the new physical theory, of which 
one of the basic features would be non-algorithmic. That non-algorithmic feature makes 
up the most important element connecting the mathematical world with the world of the 
mind.  
 
In his book The Large, the Small and the Human Mind Penrose presents four different 
viewpoints on the relation between conscious thinking and mathematical calculations. 
According to the first view – the principle of strong AI, artificial intelligence, calculations 
determine all processes of thinking. All mental events (including the consciousness) 
appear when a subject carries out calculations and they depend on a correctly composed 
algorithm. The second viewpoint describes consciousness as a result of physical events 
that occur in a brain and that can be simulated by calculations. However, these 
calculations do not evoke consciousness. All mental events are connected inseparably to 
the physical structure of the brain and the biochemical processes occurring in it. Thus, the 
brain is made of neurons and is conscious in contrast to unconscious simulations.171 This 
view is argued by John Searle, who is in favour of biological naturalism and claims that 
brains cause minds. What is more, Searle’s famous thought experiment, the Chinese 
Room, is the argument against the possibility of strong AI. He said that ‘consciousness is 
amazing product of certain kinds of human and animal brains, but it is very local and very 
special’.172    
 
Roger Penrose is the follower of the third option – the right physical processes in a brain 
cause the appearance of consciousness, however, these processes cannot be simulated 
by calculations. This means that consciousness can be understood and explained through 
physics. Nevertheless, the actions of the brain cannot be simulated by the use of 
calculations and it is impossible to make a simulation that reconstructs the operation of 
the brain. Thus, there have to be some physical mechanism in a brain that works in a 
manner impossible to calculate. This standpoint has two poles – weak and strong. 
According to the weak option, known physical laws have to be precisely examined in order 
to find some processes that are impossible to estimate. On the other hand, strong option 
supporters (Penrose) claim that our physical knowledge is not enough to explain 
consciousness and there is a need for new physical laws. According to Penrose, these 
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‘impossible to estimate processes’ can be found in physical theory that connects the level 
of quantum theory and the level of classical science.  Penrose argues that our knowledge 
of the physical world around us is incomplete. However, he does not say that in the future 
science will not be able to explain consciousness and other incomprehensible ideas.173 He 
says:  
 
perhaps, in some sense, this is ‘why’ we, as sentient beings, must live in quantum 
world, rather than an entirely classical one, despite all the richness, and indeed 
mystery, that is already presented in the classical universe. Might a quantum world 
be required so that thinking, perceiving creatures, such as ourselves, can be 
constructed from its substance?174  
 
There is also a fourth option which states that consciousness cannot be explained by the 
use of physics, mathematical calculations or any other scientific methods. Moreover, it is a 
mistake to search for scientific explanation of the phenomenon of consciousness. Roger 
Penrose argues the opposite to this and together with Stuart Hameroff has developed a 
theory on quantum gravity and microtubules.     
 
Firstly, it is essential to explain how Penrose understands computability and non-
computability. He uses the word ‘algorithm’ as a synonym of the word ‘calculation’. As an 
example, Penrose uses Euclid’s algorithm, which is used to find the highest common 
factor of two numbers. From the dawn of history there was many procedures of this type 
have been known. However the word ‘algorithm’ was only defined precisely in the 
twentieth century. The Turing’s concept is the well-known definition of the term. It was 
created by the English mathematician, Alan Turing, as a response to the question asked 
by David Hilbert regarding the possibility of the existence of algorithmic procedures for 
solving mathematical problems (Entscheidungsproblem). The Turing machine is not a 
physical device, but an idealistic mathematical object that possesses a finite set of inner 
states. Despite the fact that, it is a finite number of the states, a machine can use the 
infinite external memory and give the results of any order.175 According to Penrose, the 
Turing machine belongs to the platonic world of mathematical beings and it is an idealistic 
version of a contemporary computer. He states that the Turing machine can operate on 
numbers or mathematical formulae, such as algebraic or trigonometric expressions. ‘All 
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that one needs is some form of precise coding into sequences of 0s and 1s, of all the 
mathematical symbols that are involved, and then the Turing machine concept can be 
applied’.176 It follows that in contrast with the computable processes, the non-computable 
ones cannot be realised by the use of any real computer or its idealistic version (thus, the 
Turing machine too). 
 
According to Penrose, all known physical laws are fully computable, and can therefore be 
realised by the Turing machines. Thus, the laws governing quantum mechanics 
(Schrödinger equation),classical mechanics, relativity theory or the deterministic chaos 
belong to the computable processes. In order to show the examples of non-algorithmic 
understanding, Penrose uses the example of a toy model universe, where time is a 
discrete quantity and a state is described in a particular moment by the two polyomino 
sets. The evolution of this universe is fully deterministic, but at the same time not 
computable because ‘it follows from a theorem of Robert Berger that there is not computer 
action which can simulate the evolution of this universe because there is no computational 
decision procedure for deciding when a polyomino set will tile the plane’.177 This example 
proves that ‘computability and determinism are different things’.178  
 
Next, Penrose considers Gödel's incompleteness theorem – this is his crucial argument 
for the non-algorithmic mathematical insight. This theorem concerns two important 
aspects for the mathematics issues – the truth and the evidence. Since some correctly 
made sentences cannot be proved on the basis of the formal system, how can it be known 
that they are true. Susan Greenfield, a British scientist, explains that there are examples 
in mathematics where ‘true propositions are obtained from procedures that are not 
algorithmic, not predetermined by the set of rules. In the same fashion, Penrose observes, 
our consciousness is governed by something more than a fixed set of rules, more than a 
series of algorithms’.179 Penrose states that the concept of the mathematical truth goes 
beyond formalism, and that exploring it is possible through the reflection principle. He 
claims that: 
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by ‘reflecting’ upon the meaning of the axiom system and the rules of procedure, 
and convincing oneself that these indeed provide valid ways of arriving at 
mathematical truths, one may be able to code this insight into further true 
mathematical statements that were not deducible from those very axioms and 
rules.180  
 
Thus, for exploring the truth there is a need for some direct insight into the world of 
mathematical beings. The formal operations are not sufficient measures for determining 
the veracity of the sentences. Penrose claims that thanks to the reflection principles going 
beyond formalism, the mathematicians can consider such beings as infinite sets. Since a 
standpoint like this demands accepting that mathematical Platonism, which is the view 
that the mathematical objects exist truly and beyond the time, and the concept of the truth 
has an absolute character and demands the insight into existing absolutely in the world of 
mathematical ideas.  
 
According to Penrose, the matter of understanding in mathematics can be extrapolated to 
the understanding in any other discipline of the mind’s activity. There is no type of mental 
activity demanding the understanding that could be captured into an algorithm. The 
example with the mathematics shows that thinking has a non-algorithmic character and 
demands some insight. This non-computability can be extrapolated to the other mental 
events, including consciousness itself.  
 
The arguments presented above give the detailed explanations of the part of Penrose’s 
conceptions of the mind. It is presented that human understanding is non-algorithmic, that 
mathematical insight cannot be coded in an algorithmic procedure if there is certainty of its 
correctness. Thus, the non-algorithmic mathematical insight implies the non-algorithmic 
character of human consciousness. That is how Penrose describes the relationship which 
occurs between the mathematical world and the world of consciousness. However, the 
complete analysis of the functions of the mind demands reaching the micro level, which 
Penrose realises by creating the model of the mind in which the quantum processes will 
determine a non-algorithmic manner of thought (proved already in the macro-scale). This 
model is crucial in Penrose’s conception and makes it possible to characterise the 
relationships occurring between the world of the mind and the physical world. It has to be 
underlined that Penrose supports physicalism. Thus, all mental events are ultimately 
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reduced to physical events and the mind is an emergent structure from the world of 
physics.  
 
Allan Hobson, professor of psychiatry and director of the Laboratory of Neurophysiology at 
Harvard Medical School, admits that most neuroscientists pay more attention to 
philosophy than physics. Particularly, quantum theory that brings conundrums like 
Schrödinger’s cat (whose life or death is not determinate) or Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle (the location and velocity of particles cannot be determined with accuracy). 
Hobson says that is it common to consider philosophy as ‘the conscience of the scientific 
enterprise and hence “above” neuroscience, while physics, with its nitty-gritty concern for 
the basic nature of matter, is the foundation of science and hence “below” 
neuroscience’.181 Nevertheless, he underlines that quantum mechanics may be the hope 
of understanding phenomenon of consciousness as a state of matter. Stuart Hameroff, the 
anaesthesiologist and the director of the Centre for Consciousness Studies at the 
University of Arizona in Tucson, shares that view.  
 
Hameroff together with Penrose collaborates on the theory that consciousness depends 
on quantum coherence in microtubules. According to their hypothesis, the cytoskeleton of 
cells is equipped with its own ‘nervous system’. Penrose and Hameroff claim that the 
reversible consciousness loss during the anaesthetic is proof for the connection between 
the cytoskeleton and the consciousness. This cytoskeleton is built out of three elements: 
microtubules, actin and intermediate filaments. The microtubules are the protein polymers, 
made of tubule appearing in two forms: α- and β-tubulin dimmers (tubule is bipolar and as 
a protein occurs in two three-dimensional structures; thus in at least two different states). 
They are  long cylindrical tubes, inside of which both classical and quantum calculation 
processes should occur.182 Hameroff says that from the very beginning it seemed to him 
that ‘microtubules were excellent candidates for quantum computation, that quantum 
computing might be happening inside nerve cells where they could be isolated’.183 The 
origin of consciousness – mental activity – is determined by a non-algorithmic physical 
process that occurs at the point of contact between the macroscopic and microscopic 
structure of the brain. It is possible though that some coherent quantum activities happen 
inside the microtubules, and also ‘extend over very large areas of the brain’.184 This 
extended area of coherent quantum activities in a brain indicates the nonlocal character of 
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consciousness. Finally, the global quantum state controls the computations that occur 
along the microtubules and at the same regulates the synaptic transmissions. Moreover, 
Hameroff adds that our conscious and subconscious minds are comprised of quantum 
information. At the moment of death, that information does not completely disappear, but 
rather stays because of the quantum entanglement. Hameroff claims that it ‘stays in 
quantum superposition and does not undergo quantum state reduction or collapse, it is 
more like our subconscious mind, like our dream. And because the universe at the Planck 
scale is non-local, it exists holographically, indefinitely’.185 It could be this, what is 
generally considered as a soul.     
 
Non-algorithmic mathematical materialism and the theory that consciousness is 
neurophysiologically realised as gravitation-induced reduction of coherent superposition 
states in microtubules are criticised as being obscure. First of all, Penrose’s interpretation 
of Gödelian arguments does not confirm the thesis of non-algorithmic manner of human 
thinking. Moreover, one cannot prove one’s own non-contradiction. As Chalmers 
formulates, ‘one might have thought that the deepest flaw lay in the unjustified claim that 
one can see the soundness of certain formal systems that underlie our own reasoning’.186 
The premises from Penrose’s argument generate the contradiction, since ‘we cannot 
know unassailably that we are sound’.187  
 
Penrose and Hameroff approach brings some major difficulties with empirical 
confirmation. Additionally, the whole process of gravitation-induced reduction happens in 
an extremely sophisticated manner. The notion of quantum theory of gravity itself is still 
not fully developed. In fact, there is no agreement among the scientists, how to get that 
theory. There is string theory, which is preferred by a majority of physicists. It ‘melds 
gravity and quantum mechanics by arguing that everything in nature arises from the 
vibration of tiny strings in 10-dimensional space-time’.188 On the other hand, there is loop 
quantum gravity theory that ‘shows mathematically that space-time is woven out of loops 
in gravitational field lines’.189 Nevertheless, both of these theories lack evidence. 
Furthermore, Max Tegmark, a Swedish-American cosmologist and a professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, completely refuses to accept the possibility of the 
participation of coherent macroscopic quantum states in mental processes. According to 
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Tegmark, it is impossible because the microtubules are not screened enough from the 
influence of the environment. He claims that the ‘decoherence calculations have indicated 
that there is nothing fundamentally quantum mechanical about cognitive processes in the 
brain’.190 Moreover, Tegmark suggests that the ‘computations in the brain appear to be of 
a classical rather than quantum nature’.191 
 
Penrose, as a supporter of physicalism, assumes that all mental processes can be 
reduced to physical events. This assumption makes up the basis of the relationships 
between the physical word and the world of consciousness in the ontology he worked out. 
However, Nancy Cartwright, professor of philosophy, logic and scientific method at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, suggests that mental events are the 
subject of biological examination and need to be subordinate to biological laws. According 
to her, physics or chemistry can be helpful and provide some answers to the questions of 
a biological nature. Nevertheless, it is not possible to explain the functions of the human 
brain without biological analysis. Cartwright notices that Penrose’s conception of the mind 
and physicalism generally is very popular among physicists. She states that physicists 
claim that physics can provide them with all ultimate explanations without the need to 
evoke chemistry or biology.192   
 
3.3. Co-operating Conscious Subsystems. 
 
David Hodgson is one of the philosophers that states that quantum physics and 
consciousness are related, even if the details are not completely clear. Hodgson is 
a Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the author of numerous 
philosophical articles (mostly dedicated to the philosophy of the mind): 
Consequences of Utilitarianism (1967) and The Mind Matters: Consciousness and 
Choice in a Quantum World (1991), both published by Oxford University Press. In 
The Mind Matters, Hodgson considers whether or not our conscious minds exert a 
non-physical influence on the workings of our brains, or if we are just soft 
machines. He further considers whether a mind can affect matter without violating 
the principles of physics themselves. And while the majority of scientists and 
philosophers (for example: Daniel Dennett, Donald Davidson, John Rogers Searle, 
Paul and Patricia Churchland) today would opt for a mechanistic view of the 
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human brain, David Hodgson makes out a case for the efficacy of the mind by 
using both philosophy and quantum theory. His philosophical discussions of 
computers, consciousness, reasoning, evolution, and folk psychology lead on to a 
penetrating examination of quantum physics and its relevance to the mind. The 
author draws on quantum indeterminacy and non-locality to outline a theory of the 
relationship between mind and brain, which accommodates human freedom within 
a scientific framework.  
 
‘The initial interest in quantum mechanics as being relevant to the mind-matter 
problem concerned its indeterministic character, and the possible “room” it could 
leave for freedom of the will’193 claims Hodgson. This indeterministic character 
together with non-locality and non-materiality of the matter, Hodgson lists as 
aspects of quantum physics that have an impact on contemporary philosophical 
thought.  He underlines that fact that it is impossible to predict events occurring in 
the micro world of particles, but is possible to only determine the probabilities of 
the occurrence of these events; is not a matter of deficiency of knowledge. 
According to Hodgson, it is just the manner in which the world functions. He adds 
that this does not cause ‘general unpredictability on the macro scale of the objects 
of our everyday experience because their behaviour depends principally on the 
statistics of huge numbers of micro events, in relation to which there is practical 
certainty’.194 However, with the example of the Schrödinger’s cat experiment, 
Hodgson admits that ‘indeterminacy of prediction on the micro scale can produce 
similar indeterminacy on the macro scale’.195 
 
Hodgson states that his main hypothesis is that mental and physical events are 
aspects of manifestations of the same events of the brain-mind and that there are 
some discoverable correlations between them. He opts for the substance dualism. 
While substance dualism is often considered to imply the whole Cartesian 
tradition, some of the substance dualists, for example E. J. Lowe, Professor of 
Philosophy and Chair of the Examination Board of the Department of Philosophy 
at Durham University, emphasises that they are two distinguish theories.196 Lowe 
claims that a human being consists of two different substances: the body and the 
person. He says that they are not identical – ‘for they have different persistence 
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conditions, just as do their bodies and the masses of matter constituting those 
bodies at different times’.197 Nevertheless, the problem of the interaction between 
these two substances is mutual to both kinds of dualism.  
 
Considering the mental and physical events of the brain-mind, Hodgson claims 
that macro-physical events of neural firings are aspects of micro events in the 
quantum world, indicating that mental events are more closely related to quantum 
events than to the neural firings themselves. Secondly,  
 
even the best objective description of the events as physical events (that is, 
in their objective character), comprehending all the insight of quantum 
theory, cannot account for all the properties of mental events, in particular 
all their causal properties. And the best description of the events  as mental 
events (that is, in their subjective character) must use the language and 
concepts of folk psychology, which can, of course, be improved and 
refined.198  
 
Hodgson claims that, 
 
‘mind and brain are both manifestations of the same underlying reality. Mind 
can to some extent be said to be a function of the brain, but only if the brain 
here is understood not as the detectable macroscopic object, but as the 
quantum  reality underlying both this object and the mental events of 
consciousness’.199  
 
According to this view, there is a single reality with its two manifestations: mind 
and brain. What is more, the world can be considered as a cosmic code, as long 
as it is not interpreted by the mind. Quantum physics ‘shows that the things that 
are detectable by us, and interpreted by us as the objects and events of our 
perception, are not the fine details of this code, but rather its gross statistical 
properties’.200 This is the objective solution to the so called measurement problem 
in quantum mechanics - the nature of a particle allows the observer to know its 
momentum or position, but never these two quantities at the same time. This 
means that the observer has to decide which of these two to measure. It consists 
of indeterminism and the non-materiality of matter. According to indeterminism, all 
physical measurements, Newtonian laws or physical phenomena cannot bring 
permanent views of the world and cannot predict events; they can give only 
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probabilities for individual events. Next, the function of the non-material views of 
matter, is not to deny the existence of macro objects and macro events of people’s 
experience, but rather to suggest that, ‘in certain respect their fundamental nature 
is not as we assume it to be’.201  
 
Hodgson elaborates the conjecture underlining that the ‘important difference 
between this conjecture and the consensus position lies in the denial that any 
identity between brain and mind can be adequately considered at the level of 
neurons and neural firings’.202 He suggests that mental events and neural firings 
are just functions of the development of the states of the brain and the mind is not 
only a function of neurons and neural firings. In addition, the author considers non-
locality and applies non-local quantum effects to explain how information 
constantly flows in the brain. It is obvious that Hodgson is under the influence of 
the works by Roger Penrose, who argues that quantum theory can be effectively 
applied to explain consciousness. While Hodgson claims that, ‘mental events 
somehow span space, so as to enable simultaneous experiencing of, and acting 
upon, matters associated with spatially separated physical events’, Penrose 
(together with Hameroff) argues that fundamental entities (for example qualia) ‘if 
they are fundamental, must exist at the fundamental level of the universe, the 
lowest level of reality that exists. In modern physics that is best described at the 
Planck scale, the level at which space-time geometry is no longer smooth but 
quantized’.203, 204  Their theory is based on quantum effects that appear in tubules 
that surround the nerve fibres. These tubules are long cylindrical tubes made of 
microtubules. A tubule is bipolar and as a protein occurs in two three-dimensional 
structures, thus in at least two different states. A tubule in two forms is the 
superposition of two states. Thus, inside the tubules, both classical and quantum 
calculation processes should occur. According to Penrose and Hameroff, 
consciousness is quantum coherence in the microtubules. Hameroff explains that 
there is, 
 
quantum computation in the microtubules inside neurons that reaches the 
threshold for collapse 40 times a second, to coincide with the 40 Hz gamma 
oscillations that exist in the brain. And the outcome of each reduction is a 
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process of quantum superposition, quantum computation, which follows the 
Schrödinger equation, which is basically deterministic. However, at the 
instant of collapse there is another influence that enters. This is Penrose’s 
non-computable influence which is due to the fine grain in space-time 
geometry. This has a little influence on the choices, so that choices result 
from both the deterministic quantum computation and this non-computable 
influence.205  
 
Hodgson applies the quantum indeterminism and quantum probabilities 
concerning conscious choices. For Hodgson a person (or a brain-mind) is a 
physical-mental object and its behaviour depends to some extent on mental 
events (for example: choices that are based on desires or beliefs) and to some 
extent on physical events (that are for example: objective brain processes of 
neural firings). While the objective science suggests that the measurable physical 
properties and physical events might completely determine the behaviour of this 
object, quantum theory shows the limits of that assumption. According to the 
author, because of the quantum indeterminism, ‘it becomes clear that the physical 
properties and laws are not sufficient to determine completely the behaviour of the 
brain-mind’.206 While considering cognitive psychology and choice together with its 
relationship to quantum probabilities, Hodgson often contradicts himself. In the 
beginning he says:  
 
I suggest that the physical account could not, even in principle, predict or 
explain which choice is made: it would at most show the alternatives and 
their respective probabilities. So the brain-mind can be considered 
(consistently with the approach of cognitive psychology) as a mechanistic 
(though indeterministic) computer; but only in so far as it throws up 
alternatives for choice.207  
 
However, he then underlines that ‘the choice itself, from a physical viewpoint, 
would appear as a random reduction of these probabilities’208 and later ‘the 
general point is that computational procedures plus quantum physics would seem 
appropriate to give rise to probability-weighted alternatives. The number of 
alternatives could be finite, if the possibilities are discrete; or infinite, if they are in 
a continuous spectrum. Each choice would appear as a random state 
reduction’.209 Moreover, there is a metaphysical or theological contradiction. 
Hodgson claims that, 
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the choice does not in fact occur at random in accordance with some 
quantum probability: the apparent random occurrence of one alternative is 
simply the manifestation of the choice to the physical viewpoint. There is a 
striking statement in Wilber (1983) that ‘the Heisenberg uncertainty principle 
represents all that is left of God’s radical freedom on the physical plane’ (p. 
169); and that is substantially what I am saying about quantum 
inderterminism and human choice.210 
  
David Hodgson returns to the issue of the conscious choice in his essay A Plain 
Person’s Free Will, in which he presents his account of free will in a ‘plain person’ 
– a person that is neither a philosopher or a cognitive scientist. From his nine 
propositions, two are important for the two-stage model for free will and also 
support his hypothesis from The Mind Matters. In the first one, the author says that 
the minimum requirement for indeterministic free will is ‘the alternatives 
requirement: there is a pre-choice state such that the way the world is and the 
laws of nature leave open at least two post choice states’.211 In the fifth 
proposition, he underlines the selection requirement that is necessary for 
disproving the alleged division of determinism and randomness. It states that ‘the 
subject makes an effective non-random selection between the available 
alternatives, based on these non-conclusive reasons, albeit not determined by 
rules or laws of nature’.212 At the end of that essay, the author identifies his view 
on objective science to these from the introduction of the chapter ‘Outline of a 
Theory of Mind’ in The Mind Matters. According to Hodgson,  
 
reductionist science has had enormous success in accounting for many 
aspects of the universe, but very little success in explaining consciousness 
and its role in the way events unfold in the world. I think it is reasonable to 
believe that consciousness does have an important and irreducible causal 
role, and I suggest that something like this version of free will is required to 
account for this role.213  
 
Henry P. Stapp calls for ‘societal ramifications of the new scientific conception of 
human beings’.214 Nineteenth-century science reduced people to some sort of 
mechanical automata, where all the physical functions are governed by processes 
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occurring at atomic or subatomic levels. Since classical physics could not 
accommodate the existence of such ideas as  thoughts or qualia, it questioned 
their existence or reduced them to, at most, passive bystanders. What is more 
important, within the classical framework they could not be the cause of any 
physical event. However, quantum theory has changed the manner in which the 
physical world is understood. The subatomic level of the matter that is supposed to 
form the physical world was exchanged for a spread-out nonmaterial structure 
forming a new kind of physical reality. The reality that includes nonlocalized bits of 
information that are collected in objective carriers connected to empirical realities. 
Thus, the twenty-first-century ‘elevates human beings to agents whose “free 
choices” can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour’.215 
According to Stapp, Hodgson’s The Mind Matters ‘documents the pervasive and 
pernicious effect that the idea that “mind does not matter” is having upon our legal 
system’.216  
 
Hodgson suggests that each person should be considered as comprising of a 
number of co-operating conscious subsystems. He supports his suggestion by 
using the examples of split-brain cases and certain performances of the 
subconscious. He says that ‘the possibility that there is not just one centre of 
consciousness in human beings, but rather a collection of subsystems each of 
which may be conscious, and more or less integrated into a single system’.217 
Nevertheless, he points out that this collection of conscious subsystems does not 
exclude the unity of mind. Hodgson states that it seems clear that there is in every 
normal human being a substantially integrated consciousness, which is engaged 
for the most important experiences and actions of that person. According to the 
author, the strong argument for the unity of the mind is the fact that a person at 
any one time does only one main thing (where the main thing is an act called 
intentional by that person). The full integrated self-conscious mind does not have 
to participate in the process of making decisions by the conscious subsystems. 
Furthermore, ‘an essential characteristic of consciousness is the possibility of 
making decisions between superposed alternatives on the basis of some kind of 
holistic comparison’.218 Although Hodgson’s idea of the co-operating conscious 
subsystems might be appealing, the author gives very few details about the 
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manner in which it could work. As he admits, there are only the possibilities for the 
existence of conscious subsystems instead of just one centre of consciousness in 
human beings. He is just suggesting and considering these possibilities carefully. 
Hodgson believes that his approach can be tested in the future. For him, there is 
not, 
 
a hard-and-fast line between science and philosophy, but it is rather a 
matter of degree: the less one relies in uncertain inference, and the more 
one relies on experiment, the more scientific (and the more dependable) 
become one’s conclusions.219  
 
Scientific development may result in extending the possibilities of carrying on the 
more advanced experiments in different areas. Hodgson hopes that some of the 
aspects  of approaches to the mind-body problem he has suggested will be able to 
be tested in proper experiments.       
 
While in the mind-body problem Hodgson opts for the dualistic option, he supports 
his point using the claims and works of Roger Penrose – supporter of the non-
algorithmic mathematical materialism and the theory that consciousness is 
neurophysiologically realised as gravitation-induced reduction of coherent 
superposition states in microtubules. It also should be mentioned that, despite the 
fact that the author is generally against the mechanistic views of human brain, he 
admits that our brains-minds could be ‘machines’, but they would operate non-
algorithmically. He states that ‘human reason cannot be formalized; therefore it 
cannot be mechanized; therefore the brain-mind is not mechanistic’.220 To support 
this thesis, Hodgson argues that the brain-mind possesses some information that 
is not achievable for a non-conscious computer – such as the sense of perception 
(what-it-is-likeness) or qualia. However, he allows for a possibility that scientific 
progress will prove him wrong and says that until then ‘the choice between the 
mechanistic consensus approach and the position which I suggest will, for a long 
time, depend on uncertain plausible considerations’.221 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
219
 ibid., p. 401. 
220
 ibid., p. 114. 
221
 ibid., p. 402. 
72 
 
3.4. Monistic Idealism. 
 
Amit Goswami, theoretical nuclear physicist and member of The University of Oregon 
Institute for Theoretical Physics, applies quantum theory of consciousness to the mind-
body problem in monistic idealism. He gave a new name to traditional idealism in order to 
underline its connection with mainstream eastern philosophy and mysticism. He says ‘the 
idea that consciousness is the ground of being is the basis of all spiritual traditions’.222 
Goswami’s views on quantum theory and monistic idealism 
 
combines aspects of present-day quantum physics, including the concept of 
‘collapsing the wave function’, with a philosophical idealist or mental monist view 
that the universe is fundamentally comprised of a living consciousness field (or 
Being) from which what we take to be physical reality is really an emergent 
epiphenomenon.223   
 
First of all, the difference between realism and idealism needs to be explained. As it 
mentioned in section 7.1., Michael Lockwood, when considering quantum mechanics and 
the conscious observer, approaches the Schrödinger’s cat problem with a cat placed in its 
very own live-dead limbo. Lockwood underlines the role of the mind of the observer in that 
experiment, which also remains in two matching cat situation states. He points out that the 
experiment fails to satisfy the common-sense intuition, where the cat must be dead or 
alive regardless of the actions of the observer and concludes that  
 
state vector reduction is essentially an illusion engendered by our always viewing 
the world from the standpoints of a particular eigenstate, within our local brain 
subsystem, of some set of compatible brain observables.224  
 
Lockwood explains very roughly that ‘realism is the view that reality transcends 
experience, that propositions can be true or false, independently of our being in a position 
to tell which they are’.225 There can be direct (or naïve) realism where the sensory 
perception makes present to us the particular physical objects and these objects are 
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indeed identical with what they are perceived. This means, among other things, that 
physical objects are really sweet or bitter, red or yellow. In indirect realism an observation 
has for its subject the physical object, but only indirectly because the direct subject of a 
perception is a sensory data that represents a physical object. Not all properties directly 
perceived are qualitatively identical to properties that perceived physical objects possess. 
It means that physical objects are not actually sweet and red but have some properties 
which are perceived as flavours or colours.  
 
When considering quantum physics, scientific realism needs to be mentioned as well. The 
question of the limits of knowledge in contemporary philosophy of science takes the form 
of a dispute between scientific realism and various forms of antirealism. In accordance 
with the view that is scientific realism, the scientific terms have objective reference, 
whereas scientific statements are generally at least approximately true. The notion of the 
truth has to be understood epistemologically (at least partially) for compliance of the 
statements with reality. Thus, in the light of scientific realism, scientific theories provide us 
with the true (at least approximately) names and characteristics of subjects which exist 
objectively. It should be noted, that this applies to both objects directly observable, as well 
as those which are not directly observable. The strongest argument in favour of scientific 
realism is the so-called argument from the success of science. Its essence is as follows: 
scientific theories allow us to anticipate events, to act effectively, as well as to design and 
to construct the devices that operate as expected. The best explanation for these facts is 
that scientific theories provide us with the true (at least approximately) descriptions and 
characteristics of the subject (meaning: objects, events, actions, states and processes or 
even regularities) which actually exist. Using the words of Hilary Putnam, ‘realism is the 
only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle’.226 Putnam 
emphasises that ‘science succeeds in making many true predictions, devising better ways 
of controlling nature, and so forth, is an undoubted empirical fact. If realism is an 
explanation to this fact, realism must itself be an overarching scientific hypothesis’.227 
However, modern physics with quantum theory can be a challenge to this view, since the 
coincidence and probability becomes essential with describing events that take place on 
the quantum level of matter.228 This is why, Lookwood suggests that a possible 
philosophical response to quantum mechanics problems and the limitations of our 
physical knowledge is the abandonment of realism.  John Foster, a British philosopher 
and author of The Case for Idealism and A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic 
Idealism, goes further by saying that  
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one interesting and surprising consequence of this limitation on the scope of our 
physical knowledge is that we can envisage the possibility of the physical world’s 
being, in substance and character, purely mental. For, being ignorant of its 
content, we are free to suppose that the relevant structure and organization are 
realized in a domain of minds and mental events.229  
 
The term ‘idealism’ can be understood in many ways and even philosophers can use it in 
a wide range of meanings. For this discussion three kinds of idealism listed by Foster are 
meaningful. Foster is concerned mainly by the kind of idealism that can be expressed by 
the following claims: ‘(1) Ultimate contingent reality is wholly mental. (2) Ultimate 
contingent reality is wholly non-physical. (3) The physical world is the logical product of 
facts about human sense-experience’.230  
 
Two doctrines, directly opposing scientific realism, are phenomenalism and 
conventionalism. According to phenomenalism, the objects of external recognition cannot 
be the subjects of our knowledge, but only our mental impressions and experiences. It is 
contrary to the claim of realism that the scientific terms have objective references, 
whereas conventionalism denies that the scientific claims are true. The methodological 
assumptions are accepted on the basis of academic agreement or the system which is 
known that does not stay in authentic relation to reality. 
 
Axioms and laws of empirical science are conventions adopted because of the demand 
for simplicity, convenience or economy of thinking.231 One of the older anti-realistic 
positions is instrumentalism. Its basic idea is as follows: scientific terms are divided into 
observational (those which are solid, natural interpretation in the domain of macroscopic 
physical phenomena) and theoretical (those which cannot be observed). As a result of 
assessing the claims with observational terms, their truth or falsehood can be received. In 
turn, the claims with only theoretical terms are not subject to such an assessment, but 
they are merely tools by which predictions are led and known empirical facts are 
organised. Thus, the theoretical objects exist hypothetically in realism, while according to 
instrumentalism they are just convenient fictions. In realism scientific theories are guesses 
about the truth while in instrumentalism they are tools of making predictions about 
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phenomena. The search for the truth is the main aim of science in realism, whereas in 
instrumentalism, it is making predictions about phenomena, the domination over the 
nature and technological progress. 
 
A very specific position in the considered dispute is an internal realism proposed by Hilary 
Putnam. The principle thesis of an internal realism states as follows: the truth depends on 
the conceptual system, but the conceptual system itself does not prejudge what is true 
within it. The internal realist question: 'how many objects are there in fact, regardless of 
any conceptual system?' does not make any sense. According to internal realism, there is 
no absolute conceptual system. Putnam underlines that 
 
even a large and complex system of representations, both verbal and visual, still 
does not have an intrinsic, built-in, magical connection with what it represents – a 
connection independent of how it was caused and what the dispositions of the 
speaker or thinker are. And this is true whether the system of representations […] 
is physically realized – the words are written or spoken, and the pictures are 
physical pictures – or only realized in the mind. Thought words and mental pictures 
do not intrinsically represent what they are about.232  
 
All these forms of antirealism can be treated as being opposed to scientific realism. 
However, it is worth noting that the term 'antirealism' is often understood as a 'semantic 
antirealism'. Semantic antirealism is a theory developed by contemporary British 
philosopher Michael Dummett. According to this theory, the meaning of sentences has to 
be characterised in terms of recognisable conditions of a verifiable account. In turn, in the 
light of semantic realism, the meaning of declarative sentences comes down to what 
makes these sentences true or to the truthness of their conditions. In one of his early 
works, Dummett draws from Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
arguing that there is no one independent mathematical reality waiting to be discovered. 
Dummett claims that ‘we are free in mathematics at every point; no step we take has been 
forced on us by a necessity external to us, but has been freely chose’.233 For Lookwood, 
Dummett’s account of mathematics that opposes realism ‘would seem to fit quantum 
mechanics like a glove’.234 He recalls the Schrödinger’s cat problem pointing out that the 
cat in the final moment of the experiment is in an indefinite state. At that point, it is not 
possible to say whether the cat is alive or dead – ‘reality itself contains a lacuna at that 
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point, one which will only be filled when we open up the chamber and look inside’.235 The 
moment of opening the box and looking inside is this point in time when one of the 
statements describing the cat’s state becomes true. In other words:  
 
if we think that mathematical results are in some sense imposed on us from 
without, we could have instead the pictures of a mathematical reality not already in 
existence, but as it were coming into being as we probe. Our investigations bring 
into existence what was not there before, but what they bring into existence is not 
of our own making.236  
 
This way of reasoning is very similar to Goswami’s views on consciousness and quantum 
mechanics. However, he goes far beyond mathematical truths and thought experiments 
such as Schrödinger’s cat by claiming that the whole universe, i.e. everything that exists, 
came into being as a result of conscious observation of the individual.237 Goswami states 
that ‘quantum superpositions of possibilities (packets of possibility waves related by 
phase) occur within consciousness. When consciousness recognizes a particular 
possibility, it chooses it; the recognised possibility becomes actuality’.238  
 
Goswami uses quantum theory to explain how the illusory separation between matter and 
mental arises and to determine its nature. According to quantum theory, a quantum object 
appears in particular place if it is measured (the measurement problem), it is in 
superposition of states until it is observed (collapse of the wave) and can be in more than 
one place at the same time (the wave property). Furthermore, Alain Aspect’s experiment 
verified that objects have connections outside of space and time. The results of this 
experiment are very important for Goswami’s premise, which claims that we should 
change our worldview. In 1982 Alain Aspect, the French physicist, developed the Clauser-
Freedman experiment. Originally in the experiment, two photons were moving to the two 
different places A and B. These photons, going in opposite directions, could not 
communicate with each other using the light signal because they were moving at the 
speed of light. However, measuring instruments in places A and B were set up before the 
experiment, thus enabling the photons to communicate with each other in an ordinary way 
(using the light signals in the space and time). Alain Aspect introduced an important 
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change to this experiment – the settings of the measuring instruments could be changed 
in the very last microsecond before taking the measurement. This means that the 
information of the instruments’ settings does not have enough time to move from place A 
to place B, even at the speed of light. Moreover, these photons continue to affect one 
another’s behaviour from a distance, without exchanging any signal through space.239 
Henry Stapp wrote ‘the philosophical position of Bohr seems to lead to the rejection of the 
other possibilities, and hence by inference, to the conclusion that superluminal transfer is 
neseccary’.240 For Goswami, this experiment verifies the notion of transcendence and the 
influence that these two photons have on each other ‘must belong to a domain of reality 
that we must recognise as the transcendent domain of reality’.241 He also underlines that 
although the results verify the events occurring on the subatomic level and seem more 
apparent for submicroscopic objects (such as electrons or photons), all matter and all 
reality is governed by the same laws.  
 
Goswami claims that ‘we are always dealing with quantum objects because it turns out 
that quantum physics is the physics of every object. Whether it is submicroscopic or it is 
macroscopic, quantum physics is the only physics we have got’.242 He underlines that is 
also the reason for the paradigm shift – from what is called ‘upward causation’ to 
‘downward causation’. Goswami characterises the current paradigm as a materialistic 
view of the world where all the cause comes from the elementary particles. It can be 
described as a chain: quarks build up the elementary particles, the elementary particles 
build up the basic element of the matter – atoms. Further, atoms make up molecules, 
molecules build up cells and finally the brain is made up of cells. All the interactions and 
phenomena that take place on the subatomic level between the elementary particles are 
the ultimate cause. Goswami states that according to this view, free will is just an illusion – 
‘it is only an epiphenomenon or secondary phenomenon, secondary to the causal power 
of matter’.243 That is why Goswami speaks about the need for a new paradigm, to which 
he refers as a ‘monistic idealism’. He emphasises that his view does not deny the upward 
causation. Thus, matter still has causal potency. However, consciousness is the ground 
for all the being and it manifests itself through downward causation, which shows up in 
acts of free will, taking decisions, being creative or making moral choices.244 Goswami 
uses quantum physics as a ground for his paradigm, focusing mainly on the role of the 
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observer during taking any measurement or making any observation, and the collapse of 
the wave. He explains that 
 
because it is our observation of a quantum object that collapses the quantum wave 
of many possible facets into a unique event of actuality in our experience, we must 
say that it is our consciousness that chooses. So in quantum physics, the agent of 
downward causation is recognized as the consciousness of a human being.245  
 
According to Goswami, consciousness is primary and makes up the ground of all being. It 
consist of three realms – the world of matter and the world of mental phenomena (two 
immanent realms) and the transcendental realm. He underlines that there is nothing 
outside of consciousness and all three realms exist within and as consciousness. The two 
immanent realms exist as the phenomenal manifestation of the transcendental realm: that 
is their source. This nonlocal consciousness self-referentially collapses the wave function 
and this explains all quantum mechanics problems.246 In order to avoid raising any logical 
paradoxes, Goswami says that ‘this choosing consciousness is unitive and nonlocal – that 
is, it communicates its choice without using signals – and is the same for all of us. In other 
words, the choosing of consciousness is objective’.247  
 
Furthermore, he believes that this objective consciousness should be actually seen as the 
creator of the world. Goswami points out that while according to the Newtonian physics 
objects are perceived as definite things, in quantum physics they are just possibility 
waves. These possibilities can convert into actuality. He argues that  
 
the material world of quantum physics is just possibility. It is consciousness, 
through the conversion of possibility into actuality, that creates what we see 
manifest. In other words, consciousness creates the manifest world.248  
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However, the collapse of quantum wave function as a result of which possibilities become 
actual events, can only happen in the presence of brain-mind awareness. There is need 
for an embodied sentient being, a human observer, a conscious biological being. Thus, 
this consciousness that is not material, but transcendent, has one more important 
characteristic. Goswami calls this ‘self-reference’ and describes it as follows: ‘in the event 
of a quantum collapse, consciousness becomes “self-referent” in us, not only giving us the 
sensations of the manifest object but also the experience of a self- a subject that senses 
the object as separate from itself’.249 
Self-reference is one of the most important notions in Goswami’s views on consciousness. 
However, it is not possible to explain this key element logically and completely. Even 
Goswami writes in his book The Visionary Window: A Quantum Physicist's Guide to 
Enlightenment:  
 
But there is a paradox here. Awareness is necessary for collapse, we are saying, 
but awareness implies a subject-object split. How can such a split – itself a 
manifestation of awareness – arises without a prior collapse?250 
 
The author has tried to find the answer by introducing the ‘dependent co-arising’. He 
claims that at the moment of collapse, the subject (i.e. the reason of collapse) and object 
(i.e. is the object of awareness, the observer) are dependently co-arising. At the same 
point, Goswami underlines that it is not the case of dualism, since the split between object 
and subject is merely illusory. For him, consciousness is ‘mistaking itself to be separate 
from the objects of experience. This mistaken identity is responsible for the subject-object 
world of our experience. Experience itself could not exist without this “mistake”’.251 Firstly, 
calling the subject-object split a mistake seems to not adequately explain the whole 
phenomenon. What is more, it is hard to determine if subject and object could be one and 
the same thing since Goswami does not say precisely what the notion of subject really is. 
Secondly, this illusory division between subject and object does not follow logically the 
measurement’s being self-referential.252 This is a category error to say that nonlocal 
consciousness is derived from self-reference. In Goswami’s philosophy, self-reference is 
‘a property of propositions. It is not a property of any physical things, or indeed of any 
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mental things. So, it cannot be correct to say that a measurement “produces self-
reference”’.253  
 
What is also worth being underlined is that according to Goswami’s monistic idealism, 
mind and matter are the immanent realms existing through the transcendent realm of 
consciousness. To illustrate this with Schrödinger's cat experiment: the cat is in the state 
of superposition. The act of observation can collapse this superposition to the cat being 
alive and the cat being dead. While in the Copenhagen interpretation of this experiment, 
the superposition is in physical space-time, according to Goswami’s interpretation 
superposition of the cat’s state belongs to the transcendent realm. Both cases are 
governed by the same rules of quantum mechanics. However, in Goswami’s version, it is 
impossible to use the concepts of space or time. Thus, it is impossible to apply the 
concepts of quantum mechanics and the collapsing wave function because they are 
conceived within the context of time and space. This means that idea of nonlocal 
consciousness that collapses the wave function is meaningless. 
 
It is important, that a rational approach is not incompatible with spiritual exploration, 
mysticism and all human spiritual culture. However, the New Age phenomenon, once 
fueled by authors such as Fritjof Capra and Gary Zukav whose’ work was casually 
interpreted by the followers of the New Age Movement, became the cause of a number of 
absurdities.254, 255 These, in the scientific tone, try to undermine the existing paradigm 
without giving anything in return but pseudo-scientific gibberish. As Victor Stenger, 
emeritus professor of physics and astronomy at the University of Hawaii and Visiting 
Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Colorado characterises: 
  
Certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, the revolutionary theory developed 
early in the century to account for the anomalous behavior of light and atoms, are 
being misconstrued so as to imply that only thoughts are real and that the physical 
universe is the product of a cosmic mind to which the human mind is linked 
throughout space and time. This interpretation has provided an ostensibly scientific 
basis for various mind-over-matter claims, from ESP to alternative medicine. 
‘Quantum mysticism’ also forms part of the intellectual backdrop for the 
postmodern assertion that science has no claim on objective reality.256 
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One of the examples of such a pseudo-science is the movie What the Bleep Do We 
Know?, which combines randomly chosen fragments from quantum theory, philosophy, 
brain science and eastern mysticism.257 According to Skeptic Magazine, this movie is ‘a 
fantasy docudrama cult hit that has found national distribution and is playing to full houses 
across the country’.258 Amit Goswami is one of the scientists who agreed to take part in 
this movie, and along with other things states ‘the material world around us is nothing but 
possible movements of consciousness. I am choosing moment by moment my 
experience. Heisenberg said atoms are not things, only tendencies’.259 It has to be 
underlined that a quote like this, taken out of the context and put between other random 
quotes, can be easily misunderstood. Unlike Goswami, David Albert, a professor at the 
Columbia University physics department, who also appeared in What the Bleep Do We 
Know? accused the producers of manipulating what he said to actually fit the spiritual 
message of the movie. Albert says that  
 
it is certainly the case that I was edited in such a way as to completely suppress 
my actual views about the matters the movie discusses. I am, indeed, profoundly 
unsympathetic to attempts at linking quantum mechanics with consciousness. 
Moreover, I explained all that, at great length, on camera, to the producers of the 
film… Had I known that I would have been so radically misrepresented in the 
movie, I would certainly not have agreed to be filmed.260  
 
This particular movie is a very good example of how quantum theory (or, in fact, any 
scientific theory) can be misinterpreted and presented in a harmful way. What is more, it 
can be very misleading and misinforming that in the New Age materials, professors and 
widely understood academics with their views are put in the same line as self-styled 
prophets or experts in non-scientific fields. What the Bleep Do We Know?  
 
begins as promises of freedom of thought soon evolves into demands for correct 
thought and behavior. […] The source of the correct ideas is the prophet. The 
promised payoff for adherence to the dogma is freedom from the fears of death, 
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disease, and misery. The fact that these are deep fears that we are all vulnerable 
to, sets the stage for rampant exploitation and abuse by charlatans and cults.261  
 
Passion for quantum theory is as common in New Age literature as criticism of Newtonian 
paradigm, which is presented almost like a curse. In Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica, the beginnings of the laws of motion are discussed. These are 
among the other three universal laws of motion that were not improved until the time of 
Albert Einstein. He used the Latin word gravitas (weight) for the force that would become 
known as gravity, and defined the law of universal gravitation. In the same paper he also 
presented the first analytical determination of the speed of sound in air.262 Newtonian 
physics is still valid for systems on a scale of planetary systems, and the theories of 
quantum mechanics so readily invoked by New Age teachers do not undermine it, but 
rather complements the theories in relation to the quantum level, just as Einstein's 
theories of relativity apply to the macro-universe. Stenger claims that  
 
except for computer chips, lasers, and a few other special devices, most of today’s 
hightech society is fully explicable with classical physics alone. While quantum 
mechanics is needed to understand basic chemistry, no special quantum effects 
are evident in biological mechanisms. Thus, most of what is labeled natural 
science in today’s world still rests on a foundation of Newtonian physics that has 
not changed much, in basic principles and methods, for centuries.263  
 
This approach is both rational and empirical. In addition, it complements the quantum 
theory, which should be considered as a result of the nature of knowledge and not its 
weakness. 
 
This is related to another issue, namely the axioms. Each study is based on certain 
axioms. An axiom is a primary requirement, which is not defined. It is itself the basis for 
the definition of the formulation. Some of the axioms of Euclidean geometry, for example, 
say that the triangle is a polygon, the sum of the angles is 180 °, and the point is located 
next to the line; we can perform exactly one other straight line parallel to that. Axioms of 
first-order logic, for example, the principle of non-contradiction says that the one and the 
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same thing cannot be held to be one kind and to be not at the same time. Some scientists 
argue that the only logical axioms are the first-order predicate calculus reliable and 
consistent basis for inference, which does not require justification.264  
 
Further, Kurt Gödel,  an Austrian logician and mathematician, developed the 
incompleteness theorems and consistency.265 The first of these laws states that any 
formal system (which includes the axioms of arithmetic of natural numbers) is either 
complete or consistent, and never has both these qualities at the same time. In other 
words, the truth of all sentences of a particular system can be decided, but in the system 
there is one more true sentence negation of which is also true. Therefore, the system is 
either internally inconsistent or the system does not have to be contradictory, but then 
there are sentences whose truth cannot be inferred from the axioms and theorems of a 
formal system under consideration. The second of Gödel's theorems is the consequence 
of the previous. It says that it is impossible to prove, under this system, the consistency of 
any formal system containing arithmetic of natural numbers. To carry out this proof, there 
is need for a higher-order system, the consistency of which itself cannot be proved either 
– and so on to infinity.266 The popular understanding of Gödel's theorems can lead to 
inaccurate conclusions such as the conviction that it is never known what is true or that 
any system of reasoning is inconsistent or incomplete. For first-order logic, a system of a 
higher-order is logic of quantifiers of the second-order based on it - for example - 
mathematics. For the Newtonian physics, the system of higher-order is the quantum 
mechanics and Einstein's theory of relativity. They do not deny the Newtonian physics, but 
complement it within this range, where its axioms in the comparison with reality can lead 
to conflict or inaccurate results. It is possible that quantum physics one day will also come 
to a point where there will be a need to complement it with a system of even higher-order. 
However, it does not imply that Newton was wrong and classical physics has to be 
completely dismissed.  
 
Another phenomenon that is erroneously interpreted is the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle. Considering the wave-particle duality, these two types of properties  
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are said to be incompatible. Measurement of one quantity will in general affect the 
value the other quantity will have in a future measurement. Furthermore, the value 
to be obtained in the future measurement is undetermined; that is, it is 
unpredictable-although the statistical distribution of an ensemble of similar 
measurements remains predictable. In this way, quantum mechanics obtains its 
indeterministic quality, usually expressed in terms of the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle. In general, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics can only 
predict statistical distributions.267  
 
In the quantum world it is not possible to accurately measure both the position and 
momentum of a particle, as each measurement by its very nature affects the test object by 
changing its properties. Only average results of a series of multiple measurements can be 
provided. It is important to emphasize that this uncertainty is not a measurement error 
resulting from imperfect measurement devices or methods, but an uncertainty arising from 
the essence of the results of the measurement. The measurement itself changes the state 
of the system in the vast majority of cases. This principle is related to the physical size 
called Planck's constant, which defines a characteristic scale here. The objects for which 
the wavelength is close to this scale gain some extraordinary properties . One example is 
the electron which through tunneling can pass through a narrow barrier of potential, 
despite the fact that its energy is smaller than the height of the barrier. However, physical 
objects larger than the length determined by the Planck constant do not have such 
properties. 
 
To conclude, the Newtonian paradigm, the notion of axiom or Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle have been mentioned in order to draw attention to the fact that inaccuracy or 
incompleteness of scientific theories are not and should not be the basis on which to draw 
hasty conclusions or violent claims that the learning curve is over, and it is high time for a 
new paradigm based on something else. Moreover, they certainly should not be discussed 
in twenty-second sound bites as was done in What the Bleep Do We Know?, which 
results in ‘a blend of riveted attention and confusion that puts the critical mind to sleep, 
softening up the viewer to ideas that begin with human potential and end with walking on 
water’.268 
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However, the whole realm of human spirituality and faith is an autonomous sphere, the 
domain of mysticism. Mysticism is associated with the language of communication of 
authentic spiritual experience. It always presents the question of whether the limits of our 
language are the limits of our knowledge. For if language is to set the limits, then the next 
question arises about authenticity, and even the value of mystical experiences, in 
particular that  
 
the idea that consciousness creates reality is at the core of most religions. 
Objective reality is the unfolding of the spiritual world on the plane of physical 
existence. In the past it was consciousness of god or gods doing their work on 
earth in a rich variety of religious mythology. In New Age interpretations you are 
the god of your own individual world.269  
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Conclusion 
 
The human brain is the most complex object in the known universe and the human mind 
is the most mysterious. ‘Mind’ or ‘consciousness’ is the complex formation of capacity to 
understand subjective vision of the world through cognitive processes and active 
exploration. A subjective view of the world includes the physical world, social relations and 
ideas about ourselves. Exploration includes perception, remembering, thinking and 
evaluating. It is also an active process, which means action associated with planning acts 
of decision-making, control of behaviour and attention. A specific property of the 
consciousness is awareness, the ability to ‘realise’ our own cognitive processes. Although, 
it is possible to name some of the properties of consciousness or give examples for what 
tends intuitively to be called consciousness, there is no objective scientific definition that 
would capture the essence of this phenomenon. The first chapter of this project defines 
the difficulty of determining what consciousness really is, as well as analysing and 
critically assessing  the mind-body problem. 
 
The dichotomy of mind and body is considered from two traditional standpoints – dualistic 
and monistic. The arguments in favour of each of them are presented. While dualism 
naturally distinguishes subjective features of consciousness  from  the brain activities, a 
problem occurs in how the interaction is possible  between subjective elements and the 
physical entities present in time and space, and how these subjective elements emerge. 
On the other hand, the monistic theory does not make any distinction between the 
subjective mind and brain activity. The point to draw from in answering the first research 
question (what are the prevailing theories of the mind-body problem in the philosophy of 
mind?) is underlining the tendency of moving towards a monistic option in the mind-body 
problem. However, there is an issue for monism to explain how mind and brain can be 
one (or identical) when they appear to be so different. 
 
Since the second research question of the project critically examines whether quantum 
mechanics helps to solve the mind-body problem, in chapter two there is a focus on the 
mutual relation between philosophy and science, and physics in particular. It is underlined, 
that the mind-body problem and the notion of consciousness in the philosophy of mind 
show how strictly philosophy is connected to science. Jean Piaget’s concept of the whole 
of reality is another example of this association. According to this, our scientific knowledge 
is constantly changing, which simply means not only that philosophy has to be developing, 
but can also draw on and be inspired by new resources or fresh insight. The second 
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enquiry of this chapter is to point out the difference in philosophical and scientific 
understanding of the word ‘substance’ (crucial to the mind-body problem). Although 
everyday use of the term seems very different from the meaning it has in philosophy, an 
enquiry into the difference between these meanings shows that possible inadequacies 
and inaccuracies in interpreting physical events by philosophers and philosophical issues 
by physicists can be overcome and mutual understanding is possible. Furthermore, 
continuous evolution in science and an increasingly stronger connection of philosophy 
with other disciplines may be a forerunner of a return to the pre-Aristotelian distinction 
between philosophy as a study of being and physics as an empirical reflection of nature, 
when the subject of philosophy and physics was identical. 
 
The big challenge for physics is to create a model of the world that can be fully 
understood. An important part of that world is how to make up our minds. After one 
thousand years of philosophical debate the nature of mind is becoming clearer thanks to 
advances in neuroscience, the various branches of science investigating the structure and 
activity of the neurons in the brain. Moreover, physics is the basis for most of the 
experimental methods, including methods of imaging brain activities. The relation between 
mind and body has started to be tackled from a completely new viewpoint since 
philosophers have started to assimilate the implications of quantum physics (for example: 
quantum superposition or non-locality). ‘The historical motivation for exploring quantum 
theory in trying to understand consciousness derived from the realization that collapse-
type quantum events introduce an element of randomness, which is primary rather than 
merely due to ignorance or missing information’.270  
 
The final chapter of the project interrogates whether there is any merit in adopting 
quantum mechanics for the study of consciousness and matter. For more than forty years, 
issues related to the interpretation of the foundations of quantum mechanics, in particular 
the so-called problem of the observer and the collapse of the wave function, with the issue 
of consciousness. The quantum world is described by the wave function as the world of 
potentially existing possibilities that are realised only as the result of a measurement that 
makes it a specific phenomenon. The question is whether there is a need for an observer, 
or if a result of irreversible record is enough. There are many alternative theories of 
measurement in quantum mechanics, which do not refer to consciousness. So far, this 
line of thought has not brought any results. Although all examples of new approaches to 
consciousness analysed in this project are both promising and problematic at the same 
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time, it might still be too soon ‘for the physicists and philosophers groping towards such a 
new picture of consciousness and the universe to have produced a satisfactory outline of 
its likely shape’.271 Applying quantum mechanics to the description of the techniques and 
methods in the study of psychology and consciousness can bring a breakthrough. 
Quantum effects occur not only in mobile phones and computers, but also in neurons, in 
which a picture of reality is created. According to many contemporary physicists the 
problem of consciousness is related to the structure of space-time on the Planck scale. If 
we accept the quantum theory of consciousness, we need to select a scene in which 
quantum processes take place. This scene is the brain that in quantum theory is an 
empty, four-dimensional space-time, which has its own internal structure of an 
unimaginably small scale (the Planck length). At these distances, space is like ‘foam’, 
whose cells have a microscopic volume (an atom spatially consists in almost one hundred 
percent of the quantum vacuum). According to current knowledge this  vacuum ensures 
the stability of atoms. If consciousness is also fixed in the quantum vacuum, it may affect 
the properties of matter. Hameroff together with Penrose collaborates on the theory that 
consciousness depends on quantum coherence in microtubules that are qualified as 
atomic structure because of their sizes, which means that they are governed by quantum 
laws.  According to their hypothesis, the cytoskeleton of cells is equipped with its own 
‘nervous system’. Penrose and Hameroff claim that the reversible consciousness loss 
during the anaesthetic is proof of the connection between the cytoskeleton and the 
consciousness. However, non-algorithmic mathematical materialism and the theory that 
consciousness is neurophysiologically realised as gravitation-induced reduction of 
coherent superposition states in microtubules are criticised as being obscure and the 
Penrose - Hameroff approach brings some major difficulties with empirical confirmation. 
The extremely sophisticated way in which the whole process of gravitation-induced 
reduction occurs in microtubules, developed by Penrose and Hameroff, might be perfectly 
comprehensible in the foreseeable future. However, today it is rather speculative. 
 
Similarly to Penrose, David Hodgson states that mental and physical events are 
aspects of manifestations of the same events of the brain-mind and there are 
some discoverable correlations between them. He claims that macro-physical 
events of neural firings are aspects of micro events in the quantum world, which 
means that mental events are more closely related to quantum events than to the 
neural firings themselves. As he admits, there are only the possibilities for the 
existence of conscious subsystems instead of only one centre of consciousness in 
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human beings. He is just suggesting and considering these possibilities carefully. 
Hodgson believes that his approach can be tested in the future. Scientific 
development may result in extending the possibilities of carrying on the more 
advanced experiments in different areas. Hodgson hopes that some of the aspects 
of approaches to the mind-body problem he has suggested will be able to be 
tested in proper experiments.  
 
On the other hand, Amit Goswami applies quantum theory of consciousness to the 
mind-body problem in monistic idealism. Goswami’s  views on quantum theory and 
monistic idealism are the combination of the aspects of quantum physics with the 
mental monist view that there is a living consciousness being and what we take to 
be physical reality is really an emergent epiphenomenon. According to Goswami, 
consciousness is primary and makes up the ground of all being. This nonlocal 
consciousness self-referentially collapses the wave function and this explains all 
quantum mechanics problems. While penetrating the prevailing theories, the risk 
of applying the theories chaining together mysticism and New Age Movement with 
the quantum theory and philosophy of mind is underlined. It is important that a 
rational approach is not incompatible with spiritual exploration, mysticism and all 
human spiritual culture. However, the New Age phenomenon, once fueled by 
authors such as Fritjof Capra and Gary Zukav whose work was casually 
interpreted by the followers of the New Age Movement, became the cause of a 
number of absurdities. Nevertheless, the development of quantum mechanics 
might bring a clear explanation for Goswami’s idea of nonlocal consciousness that 
causes collapse and verify his philosophy or any other theory that seems lacking 
serious scientific or philosophical background. 
 
In spite of applying quantum theory to the mind-body problem, there is still no final answer 
to what consciousness is. It is quite possible that comprehensive definitions of the 
phenomenon require theories of many types. Nevertheless, Henry Stapp wrote in 1971: 
‘Human inquiry can continue indefinitely to yield important new truth’.272 Although 
theoretical, quantum mechanics has initiated a reexamination of the views of brains and 
bodies so far. It may explain consciousness and provide the answers to the age-old 
metaphysics questions about the relationship and parallelisms of body and mind. On the 
other hand, it may not. 
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